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In Syria, the United States is "training and equipping" non-state groups to
battle ISIS. In Eastern Ukraine, Russia has provided weapons, training, and
support to separatists. In China, "private" computer hackers operating with
state support create codes designed to infiltrate sensitive computer systems.
These are just afew examples of the many ways in which states work with non-
state actors to accomplish their military and political objectives. While state/
non-state collaboration can be benign, it can be malignant where a state uses a
non-state actor as a proxy to violate international law. This is no mere academic
hypothetical: consider the Former Republic of Yugoslavia's upport of the Free
Serbian Army, which committed the genocide at Srebrenica.
Recognizing this problem, international courts have developed a doctrine
of state responsibility designed to hold states accountable for internationally
wrongful acts of their non-state-actor partners. Unfortunately, existing doctrine
leaves an accountability gap and fails to correct the perverse incentive to use
non-state actors as proxies for illegal acts. Moreover, it creates a second
perverse incentive: states with good intentions might avoid training non-state
actors in international law compliance to avoid crossing the "bright line" for
attribution.
This Article proposes afix to these problems, building on an interpretation
of the Geneva Conventions released by the International Committee of the Red
Cross (ICRC) in March 2016. It argues that the duty "to ensure respect" in
Common Article 1 can fill the legal gap. In addition, it argues that Common
Article I will be more widely embraced, and therefore more effective, if states
that have exercised ue diligence to prevent violations are allowed an affirmative
defense against liability for any ultra vires violations. The Article concludes with
recommendations for states that wish to fulfill their Common Article 1
obligations in good faith while working with non-state actors.
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Introduction
States frequently work with and through non-state actors, sometimes in
cases where direct state action would have been politically or legally suspect.
During the past few years, for example, the United States has financed,
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armed, and trained opposition forces in Syria.1 Russia has assisted and
supplied separatist forces in eastern Ukraine.2 Iran continues to arm and fund
Hezbollah in Lebanon.3 Across the globe, states fund, arm, train, and assist
non-state actors engaged in armed conflict.4  Moreover, in many of these
cases, non-state actors take actions that would violate international law if
undertaken directly by a state or its organs.s
1. Michael D. Shear, Helene Cooper & Eric Schmitt, Obama Administration Ends Effort to
Train Syrians to Combat ISIS, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/
world/middleeast/pentagon-program-islamic-state-syria.htl [https://perma.cc/NHP4-22CM].
2. David M. Herszenhorn & Peter Baker, Russia Steps Up Help for Rebels in Ukraine War,
N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/26/world/europe/russian-artillery-
fires-into-ukraine-kiev-says.html [https://perma.cc/EE9M-YAD2].
3. Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran's Support of the Hezbollah in Lebanon, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC
& INT'L STuD. 2-3 (July 15, 2006), http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/060715-hezbollah.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P5DT-B5GE].
4. The question of state responsibility for non-state-actor conduct certainly exceeds the context
of armed conflict. Our inquiry here, however, focuses primarily on attempting to resolve the
accountability gap in the armed-conflict context. We focus our attention here for at least three
reasons: first, while it is ambiguous what aspects of international law apply to non-state actors
generally, in the armed-conflict context it is clear that non-state groups, at a minimum, have
obligations under Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions; second, the control tests for
attribution of state responsibility themselves have been developed through assessment of non-state
actors' roles in armed conflict; third, our proposed solution to the accountability gap relies on
international obligations that apply in the context of armed conflict. We do not claim that the
solution we offer here would suffice to close the accountability gap for all state engagement with
non-state actors, but nevertheless hope that it may gesture toward future avenues of research for
closing the gap entirely.
5. There is substantial literature dealing with the issue of what law binds non-state actors in the
context of armed conflict. While norms in this area are continuing to develop, for the purposes of
this Article we accept the consensus view that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies
to organized non-state groups that are party to an armed conflict. See Geneva Convention Relative
to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3518-20.
Additionally, while not weighing in here on the complex debates about the scope of international
law obligations that regulate non-state actors, we nevertheless argue that, at a minimum, it is quite
clear that international law obligates state conduct in the context of armed conflict more extensively
than it does the conduct of non-state actors. See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations for
Non-State-Actors: Where Are We Now?, in DOING PEACE THE RIGHTS WAY: ESSAYS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELATIONS IN HONOUR OF LOUISE ARBOUR (Fannie Lafontaine &
Frangois Larocque eds., forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 4-5) (suggesting non-state actors already
have international obligations, just not as many as states); Hans-Joachim Heintze & Charlotte Lilf,
Non-State Actors Under International Humanitarian Law, in NON-STATE ACTORS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 97, 97-111 (Math Noortmann, August Reinisch & Cedric Ryngaert eds.,
2015) (discussing the status of humanitarian non-state actors in the context of international
humanitarian law); Christian Henderson, Non-State Actors and the Use of Force, in NON-STATE
ACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 77, 77-96 (Math Noortmann, August Reinisch & Cedric
Ryngaert eds., 2015) (arguing that international law governing the use of force by states against
non-state actors is significantly more developed than the law governing the use of force by non-state
actors); Tim Rutherford, Everyone's Accountable: How Non-State Armed Groups Interact with
International Humanitarian Law, 198 AUSTL. DEF. FORCE J. 76, 76 (2015) ("[I]f the notion that
international law is derived from the consent of those it governs remains true, there is a disconnect
in whether international law can bind the non-state actor.").
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This raises a pressing issue: When is a state responsible for the actions
of a non-state actor? This question leads, in turn, to a host of additional
questions: What degree of control does a state need to exercise over a non-
state actor to be held liable for that actor's conduct? What actions should
states take to ensure their non-state partners comply with their international
law obligations? When states train and advise groups not to commit
violations of international law, should they be held responsible when those
actors do commit violations?
This problem is not new. The use of non-state actors as proxies was a
prominent feature of the Cold War, perhaps most famously in the Bay of Pigs
Invasion in 19616 and the proxy war in Afghanistan throughout the 1980s.7
But the problem has risen to new prominence in recent years. Faced by
stringent legal limits on their own direct action, states have exploited what
has become a large and growing loophole in the international legal
framework: States that work through non-state actors operate in a zone of
legal uncertainty. As long as the doctrine of state responsibility for the
actions of non-state actors remains unclear, states can exploit that uncertainty
to make an end-run around their own legal obligations. This allows states to
appear to abide by the law, while achieving all their illegal aims indirectly
through non-state actors that would be unable to act without their support.
The potential damage to the international legal framework is enormous.
In this Article, we argue that existing state-responsibility doctrine is
insufficient to meet the current challenges. The International Law
Commission's Draft Articles on state responsibility and the jurisprudence of
the international courts have continued to rely on a variety of "control tests"
to determine the scope of state responsibility for non-state-actor conduct.
The current law of state responsibility focuses on whether the actions of a
non-state actor can be "attributed" to a state. Under the framework for
attribution, states must be shown to exercise a sufficient degree of control
over the act or the actor in order to be held liable for non-state actors'
commission of internationally wrongful acts. Yet, despite states' pervasive
engagement with non-state actors, courts have rarely found states liable under
these control tests. The resulting framework has led to a critical
accountability gap in state-responsibility doctrine: States too often
6. See, e.g., Chris Loveman, Assessing the Phenomenon of Proxy Intervention, 2 CONFLICT
SECURITY & DEV. 29, 30-31 (2002) (discussing Bay of Pigs as a proxy intervention using a group
of exiles). See generally POLITICS OF ILLUSION: THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION REEXAMINED (James
G. Blight & Peter Kornbluh eds., 1998) (documenting an oral history of the invasion, including
testimony from former CIA officials).
7. See generally, STEVE COLL, GHOST WARS: THE SECRET HISTORY OF THE CIA,
AFGHANISTAN, AND BIN LADEN, FROM THE SOVIET INVASION TO SEPTEMBER 10, 2001 (2004)




effectively escape responsibility for violations of the laws of armed conflict
if they act through non-state partners. It has also created dangerous
incentives for states. They not only have little reason to police the actions of
non-state actors that fall below the threshold for attribution, they may even
be actively discouraged from taking actions to mitigate the danger of
international humanitarian law (IHL) violations by non-state actors: They
may worry that taking measures to prevent violations could cause them to
exercise control that might subject them to liability even for ultra vires acts.
In March 2016, the International Committee of the Red Cross issued
new commentaries on the Geneva Convention-the first in more than six
decades.' Contained within them is a possible answer to the problem created
by modern state-responsibility doctrine: Common Article 1 of the Geneva
Conventions obligates states to "undertake to respect and to ensure respect"
for the Conventions in all circumstances.9 The ICRC Commentarieso
conclude that Common Article 1 imposes not only negative obligations on
states not to encourage violations of the law of armed conflict, but also
positive third-party obligations on a state that closely coordinates its activities
with non-state actors.11
8. The ICRC released a new set of commentaries in March 2016. This was the most extensive
ICRC Commentary since the Pictet Commentaries, which were released in English in four volumes
between 1952 and 1960. See, e.g., INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY: III GENEVA
CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR (Jean S. Pictet ed., A.P. de
Heney trans., 1960).
9. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S.
85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners
of War art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III];
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 1, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]; see also Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims
of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 1, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter First
Additional Protocol].
10. INT'L COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY OF 2016, art. 1, ¶ 154 (2d ed.
Mar. 22, 2016), https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCI-commentary [https://perma.cc/DS59-
WWLZ] [hereinafter ICRC] ("This duty to ensure respect by others comprises both a negative and
a positive obligation. Under the negative obligation, High Contracting Parties may neither
encourage, nor aid or assist in violations of the Conventions by Parties to a conflict. Under the
positive obligation, they must do everything reasonably in their power to prevent and bring such
violations to an end.").
11. It is also important to note that Common Article 1 places affirmative responsibilities on
states in both a non-international armed conflict (a conflict between a state and one or more non-
state actors), and an international armed conflict (where two or more states are parties). Id. at art. 1,
¶ 125 ("The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for 'the present
Convention' in all circumstances.... Thus, the High Contracting Parties must also ensure respect
for the rules applicable in non-international armed conflict, including by non-State armed
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The precise scope of Common Article 1 obligations-in particular,
whether Common Article 1 places any affirmative responsibility on states to
ensure respect by actors it does not work with directly-has yet to be clarified
by the ICRC. Nonetheless, this little-noticed provision carries immense
possibility: It could close much of the gap in state responsibility for non-state
actors in armed-conflict situations. Some states might worry that Common
Article 1 places them in a no-win situation: If they do not take steps to meet
positive Common Article 1 obligations, they are in violation of their Geneva
Convention obligations. But if they do take actions necessary to meet
positive Common Article 1 obligations, they may end up exercising sufficient
"control" to trigger state responsibility-even for ultra vires actions. Indeed,
it is precisely this danger that may be leading some states to resist the broader
interpretation of Common Article 1 advocated by the ICRC. To address this
concern, we propose an affirmative defense for actions taken by states in
furtherance of their Common Article 1 duties. Doing so would be consistent
with the intent of the applicable legal framework and would create the right
incentives for state and non-state actor compliance with the laws of armed
conflict. States would be obligated to ensure their non-state partners abide
by their IHL obligations, without worrying that actions taken to assure such
compliance would increase the state's risk of liability for the non-state
groups' ultra vires actions.
The remainder of this Article is organized into five sections. Part I
offers an overview of the current framework for attribution and the problems
associated with the high evidentiary burdens that exist under its control tests
for state responsibility. This Part aims not only to provide background for
the argument that follows, but also to bring clarity to an important body of
law that is frequently misunderstood. Part II provides an analysis of the
perverse incentives that the modern attribution framework creates for state
actors that wish to collaborate with non-state actors in the context of armed
conflict. Part III examines state obligations under Common Article 1 of the
Geneva Conventions and shows how the ICRC's new proposed positive "due
diligence" standard could ameliorate the gap in state-responsibility doctrine.
Part IV proposes a new affirmative defense for actions taken in furtherance
of compliance with Common Article 1 duties. Finally, Part V offers a set of
ex ante and ex post recommendations to states seeking to fulfill their
obligations to ensure non-state partners comply with international law in the
context of armed conflict.
groups . . . ."). While not all of the Articles of the Geneva Convention apply in an armed conflict,
the "duty to ensure respect" that this Article discusses does.
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I. The Current Legal Framework
The International Law Commission (ILC), International Court of Justice
(ICJ), and International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
have all considered the problem of state responsibility for the actions of non-
state actors in the context of armed conflict. Though these efforts have
addressed elements of the accountability gap for the actions of non-state
actors, they have thus far failed to resolve the problem.
There are several reasons for this failure. The first, and most obvious,
is that each has taken a different-and sometimes even contradictory-
approach to the dilemma of state responsibility. This has led to widespread
confusion among those seeking to make sense of the legal obligations on
states. Even putting the confusion and contradiction to one side, each of the
approaches to the doctrine of state responsibility shares an additional, more
troubling shortcoming: Each treats state responsibility as a bright-line test-
a state is responsible, or it is not. There is nothing in between. This is because
the doctrine of state responsibility has been centered around the question of
attribution: Is the conduct of this non-state actor attributable to a state? In
other words, should the conduct of the non-state actor be treated as if the state
itself were the actor?
As we shall show in the sections that follow, this approach to state
responsibility is at once too lenient and too strict. On the one hand, until a
state passes the bright line and triggers state responsibility, it will not be held
accountable for the actions of non-state actors. This is true even if the state
has enabled a non-state actor to engage in behavior that violates international
law and even if the state provided the enabling support with the intention that
the non-state actor take actions that the state is itself legally prohibited from
taking (for instance, an illegal use of force or extrajudicial killing). On the
other hand, the bright-line approach to state responsibility also means that
once states cross over the line for triggering state responsibility, they may be
held responsible for the actions of non-state actors, even if they specifically
directed those actors not to engage in the actions in question. Indeed, it is
likely that this over- and under-inclusiveness has bred much of the
disagreement in the doctrine of state responsibility. Faced with the bright
line, international judicial bodies are forced to pick a poison-holding a state
accountable for nothing or for everything, when the truth likely lies in
between. The two bodies that have addressed this issue have found different
poisons more palatable.
In the sections that follow, we seek, first, to outline the current approach
to state responsibility by the international organizations that have addressed
it most prominently. We begin with the ILC's Draft Articles on State
Responsibility, which is the most widely embraced description of state
responsibility, and yet the most ambiguous. We then turn to the case law of
two international judicial bodies, each of which has adopted a different test
5452017]
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for state responsibility. The ICJ has embraced the "effective control" test,
which draws a very high bar for triggering state responsibility. By contrast,
the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has embraced the "overall control test,"
which relies on different elements of control to establish state responsibility.
We show that it may be possible to reconcile these apparently contradictory
approaches by viewing them as providing two different tests based on
whether the state is being held responsible for a non-state actor or for just a
single operation by the non-state actor. Yet even accepting this (admittedly
minority) approach to making the best sense of existing doctrine, the problem
remains that the bright-line approach is ill-suited to the project of
encouraging states to act in ways that ensure the non-state actors that they
support abide by international law.
A. The ILC's Draft Articles on State Responsibility
The ILC's 2001 Draft Articles on State Responsibility are currently the
most authoritative statement on state responsibility in international law.12
Through the Draft Articles, the ILC sought to clarify and codify the different
standards international courts have elaborated for attributing non-state actors'
conduct to states.13 In 2007, in Bosnian Genocide, the ICJ also declared that
both Articles 4 and 8 of the Draft Articles reflect customary international
law.14
Articles 4 and 8 of the Draft Articles are the most significant articles for
assessing state responsibility for non-state-actor conduct during armed
conflict. Under the Draft Articles, a non-state actor's act is attributable to a
state if the state has sufficient connections with the actor (Article 4) or with
the operation during which the act takes place (Article 8). Article 4 concerns
responsibility for the conduct of non-state actors that can be considered de
jure or de facto state organs. Article 8 concerns responsibility for violations
committed by non-state actors during an operation that is imputed to a state.
Article 4 of the Draft Articles provides:
1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that
State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative,
executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it holds
12. Report ofthe International Law Commission on the Work oflts Fifty-Third Session, [2001]
2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 26-30, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 [hereinafter Draft Articles]. The Draft Articles
"are considered by courts and commentators to be in whole or in large part an accurate codification
of the customary international law of state responsibility." JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE
RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 43 (2013).
13. See CRAWFORD, supra note 12, at 43-44 (contending that the Draft Articles "are an active
and useful part of the process of international law" that codify customary state responsibility).
14. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide




in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ
of the central Government or of a territorial unit of the State.
2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in
accordance with the internal law of the State.15
In its commentary to Article 4, the ILC clarifies that "a State cannot
avoid responsibility for the conduct of a body which does in truth act as one
of its organs merely by denying it that status under its own law."l 6 Therefore,
absent evidence that the non-state actor is a de jure organ of the state, the
question under Article 4 boils down to whether the non-state actor is a de
facto organ of the state. The Article thus precludes states from avoiding
responsibility for a non-state actor that functions as a state organ by simply
failing to acknowledge it as such. For instance, a state could not create, fund,
and direct a militia, and then use it to evade legal limits on the state's own
actions-for instance, killing civilians in violation of the Geneva
Convention's principle of distinction. Under Article 4, the actions of the
militia would be attributed to the state.
Article 8 of the Draft Articles provides:
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act
of a State under international law if the person or group of persons is
in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control
of, that State in carrying out the conduct.17
The ILC's commentary to Article 8 notes that "the three terms
'instructions', 'direction' and 'control' are disjunctive; it is sufficient to
establish any one of them."18 Therefore, absent express instructions or
direction from the state to the non-state actor to commit the act, the question
boils down to whether the state exercised a sufficient degree of "control" over
the act. The focus of the inquiries under Article 4 and Article 8 is therefore
different. Under Article 4, the question is the level of control the state
exercises over the actor that undertakes the act, whereas under Article 8, it is
the level of control the state exercises over the operation during which the
act occurs.
While some commentators have suggested that "the ILC sought to allow
for greater state responsibility under the Articles as adopted,"19 most
15. Draft Articles, supra note 12, at art. 4.
16. Id at art. 4 cmt. 11.
17. Id at art. 8.
18. Id. at art. 8 cmt. 7.
19. See Dayna L. Kaufman, Don't Do What I Say, Do What I Mean!: Assessing a State's
Responsibility for the Exploits of Individuals Acting in Conformity with a Statement from a Head of
State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2603, 2653 (2002) ("[C]hanges in the Articles on State Responsibility
from their original draft form to their form as adopted suggest that perhaps the ILC sought to allow
for greater state responsibility under the Articles as adopted. Additionally, there is greater interest
2017] 547
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recognize the Draft Articles as codifying and clarifying the applicability of
pre-existing judicial tests for state responsibility.20 The most prominent
judicial tests for state responsibility are the "effective control" test of the ICJ
and the "overall control" test of the ICTY. It is therefore to those that we
turn next.
B. The ICJ's Effective Control Test
The ICJ was the first to confront the problem of state responsibility for
non-state actors. It responded by creating a new legal standard for finding
state responsibility: If an applicant could prove that a state had sufficiently
close ties to, and had furnished sufficient support for, a non-state actor, courts
would attribute the non-state actor's actions to the state--essentially
"piercing the veil" of the proxy relationship.
In 1984, in Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against
Nicaragua (Nicaragua),21 Nicaragua instituted proceedings against the
United States for its use of the Contras-a non-state armed group operating
in and around Nicaragua-to fight the socialist Sandinista government.
Nicaragua alleged, and the ICJ found, that the United States was directly
responsible for the internationally wrongful act of mining Nicaraguan ports.22
However, Nicaragua also alleged indirect U.S. involvement-via training,
financing, and direction provided to paramilitaries-in other internationally
wrongful acts carried out by the Contras.2 3
The ICJ found that the United States had supported the Contras in the
following ways:
The United States financed, organized, trained, supplied, equipped, and
armed the Contras, and provided them with reconnaissance aircraft,
intelligence, and surveillance.24
The United States decided and planned-or at least closely collaborated
in deciding and planning-a number of military and paramilitary operations
internationally in holding States responsible for their conduct with respect o private individuals, as
evinced by recent General Assembly resolutions regarding terrorism." (citations omitted)).
20. See CRAWFORD, supra note 12, at 43-44. The ILC adopted the most recent version of the
Draft Articles in August 2001-after the ICJ's 1986 Judgment in Nicaragua and the ICTY's Tadid
Appeals Chamber decision, but before the ICJ's repudiation of the ICTY's overall control test in
Bosnian Genocide. See Draft Articles, supra note 12, at 25; cf Bosnian Genocide, Judgment, 2007
I.C.J. 43 (Feb. 26); Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]; Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-
1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 327 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999)
[hereinafter Tadid].
21. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14.
22. Id ¶ 292(4).
23. Id. ¶ 100-08, 112, 115, 118-19, 122.
24. Id. ¶M 100-01, 108, 115.
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by the Contras,25 and devised and directed specific strategies and tactics on
when to seize and hold territory.2 6 In addition, the United States selected
some of the Contras' military and paramilitary targets and provided
operational support.27
The United States prepared and distributed a manual suggesting that the
Contras shoot civilians attempting to leave a town, neutralize local judges
and officials, hire professional criminals to carry out "jobs," and provoke
violence at mass demonstrations to create "martyrs."28 In other words, the
United States "encouraged" the commission of unlawful acts.29
But in deciding what legal consequences should follow from these
actions, the Court faced more than simply a legal challenge. After it found
that it had jurisdiction, the United States not only withdrew from the case,
but it also withdrew its optional declaration accepting the compulsory
jurisdiction of the Court.3 0 As a result, the Court was under significant
pressure to deliver a judgment that, on the one hand, asserted its jurisdiction
despite the withdrawal of the United States, and, on the other, was limited
enough in scope that it would not undermine the legitimacy of the Court in
the event he United States decided to flout the final ruling.
Likely as a result of this politically sensitive situation, the Court drew a
bright line that established a high bar for state responsibility. It concluded
that in order for a state to be held responsible for the actions of a non-state
actor, "[I]t would in principle have to be proved that that State had effective
control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the
alleged violations were committed."31 Under this "effective control"
standard, a later case clarified, private conduct that is merely supported,
financed, planned, or otherwise carried out on behalf of the state is not
attributable unless the state also exercises a high level of control "in respect
of each operation in which the alleged violations occurred."3 2
25. Id. 106.
26. Id. 104. It is not clear whether the alleged violations of human rights and humanitarian
law occurred in the course of these operations.
27. Id. ¶ 112, 115.
28. Id ¶ 118-19, 122.
29. Id ¶ 292(9).
30. Statement on the U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the
International Court of Justice, Jan. 18, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 246; United States: Department of State
Letter and Statement Concerning Termination of Acceptance of I.C.J. Compulsory Jurisdiction,
Oct. 7, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1742; see also Text of the U.S. Statement on Withdrawalfrom Case Before
the World Court, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/01/19/world/text-of-
us-statement-on-withdrawal-from-case-before-the-world-court.html [https://perma.cc/5FR2-
KKKJ].
31. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 115 (emphasis added).
32. Bosnian Genocide, Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, 1400 (Feb. 26) (emphasis added).
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Applying this standard, the ICJ found that the combination of funding,
training, public support, strategic guidance, and tactical directives cited
above was insufficient for a finding of state responsibility.33 The opinion
implied that this was because Nicaragua had failed to prove a direct link
between these forms of support and the execution of any particular operation,
i.e., the United States had not specifically instructed the commission of
unlawful acts.34 The ICJ took pains to note that proof of control over a
specific operation was required for a finding of attribution.
Practically, this meant that unless the plaintiff could provide evidence
directly connecting a state's funding, training, and tactical or strategic
guidance to the execution of a discrete internationally wrongful act, there
could be no finding of attribution. In other words, the test set a high
evidentiary bar, particularly in the context of a contentious case, where
evidence indicative of the kind of control required over a specific operation
would generally be classified and in exclusive control of the state.3 6
In its 2007 judgment in Application ofthe Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnian Genocide), the ICJ
confirmed the effective control test and again applied it in a way that
indicated that it established a high evidentiary burden to find attribution.37
The case raised the question of whether the acts of military and paramilitary
groups operating on the territory of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (SFRY)38 could be attributed to the government in the period
33. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. TT 103-07, 115.
34. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 115 ("For this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of
the United States, it would in principle have to be proved that that State had effective control of the
military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed."
(emphasis added)).
35. The ICJ later explicitly affirmed the requirement of control over a specific operation in
Bosnian Genocide. Bosnian Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. ¶ 400 ("It must ... be shown that this 'effective
control' was exercised, or that the State's instructions were given, in respect of each operation in
which the alleged violations occurred, not generally in respect of the overall actions taken by the
persons or groups of persons having committed the violations." (emphasis added)). The
requirement of control over a specific operation is the major factor that distinguishes the ICJ's
effective control test from the ICTY's overall control test. The evidentiary threshold of the ICTY's
test is easier to clear-once it is proved that material support has flowed to an actor, this may provide
the basis for a finding of control over the actor.
36. Although the ICJ has the authority to compel states to produce documents under Article 49
of its statute, in Bosnian Genocide the Court declined to order Serbia to produce unredacted versions
of state documents that incriminated Belgrade in the Srebrenica genocide. See Bosnian Genocide,
2007 I.C.J. 241, ¶ 35 (dissenting opinion by Al-Khasawneh, V.P.).
37. Bosnian Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶¶ 208-09, 400-01.
38. The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, often referred to by the acronym SFRY,
existed until from the end of World War II until 1991, when it broke into pieces. Its army is the
Yugoslav National Army, often referred to by the acronym JNA. The Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, often referred to by the acronym FRY, existed from 1992-2003, and primarily
consisted of a federation between the republics of Serbia and Montenegro. Its army was created
550 [Vol. 95:539
Ensuring Responsibility
before its disintegration in the early 1990s.39 Specifically, the suit alleged
that the murder of Bosnian Muslim men at Srebrenica by members of the
Republika Srpska's official military wing, the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS),
should be attributed to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), as the
legal successor to the SFRY.40 (At the time, Republika Srpska was an
unrecognized breakaway republic and therefore did not yet bear its own legal
responsibilities as a state.)
The ICJ found that the FRY was "making .. . considerable military and
financial support available to the Republika Srpska, and had it withdrawn that
support, this would have greatly constrained the options" of the breakaway
republic's authorities.4 1 The ICJ furthermore determined that there were
"close ties" between the government of the FRY and officials of the
Republika Srpska; there had been a major transfer of personnel, arms, and
equipment from the army of the FRY to the VRS, as well as financial support
from FRY authorities to VRS officers; and, furthermore, there was
substantial economic integration between the Republika Srpska and the FRY
(among other things, loans from the FRY underwrote most of the budget of
the breakaway republic).42
Despite these ties, the ICJ held that while Bosnia and Herzegovina had
proven that FRY had supported the VRS and the Republika Srpska, and that
the VRS's acts at Srebrenica had been acts of genocide, it had failed to prove
that the acts of the VRS were attributable to the FRY under the effective
control test.4 3 Explaining its decision, it wrote:
The Applicant has not proved that instructions were issued by the
federal authorities in Belgrade, or by any other organ of the FRY, to
commit the massacres, still less that any such instructions were given
with the specific intent (dolus specialis) characterizing the crime of
genocide . . . . All indications are to the contrary: that the decision to
kill the adult male population of the Muslim community in Srebrenica
was taken by some members of the VRS Main Staff, but without
instructions from or effective control by the FRY.44
Here, the ICJ appeared to require evidence of explicit instructions to
commit the massacre-and even evidence of genocidal intent45-in order to
from the remains of the JNA and was called "Vojska Jugoslavije," often referred to by the acronym
VJ.
39. Id. TT 64-65, 236-37.
40. Id ¶ 278.
41. Id ¶241.
42. Id. TT 237-40.
43. Nor could any of the acts alleged that did not amount to genocide be attributed to the FRY.
44. Bosnian Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. ¶ 413.
45. Although the necessity of finding intent likely also was exacerbated by the dolus specialis
requirements of the crime of genocide. See, e.g., Kai Ambos, What Does Intent to Destroy' in
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meet the effective control standard. By requiring evidence of specific
instructions tied to a particular operation, the ICJ set an extremely high bar
for attribution.
Because the ICJ did not find effective control in either Nicaragua or
Bosnian Genocide, it is unclear exactly what set of facts would satisfy the
"effective control" test. However, it is clear that it sets a high threshold.46
Hypothetically, a state's use of a non-state actor to carry out a targeted killing
would constitute an exercise of effective control over a non-state actor.4 7 Yet,
the state's involvement would likely have to entail significant control over
the military operation-at the very least, it would have to exceed that
exercised by the United States over the Contras or the FRY over the VRS.
The ICJ's reasoning in Nicaragua and Bosnian Genocide might be read to
suggest that a state could arm, fund, support, train, and facilitate the
operations of an armed, non-state group, and even encourage the non-state
group to carry out ethnic cleansing as a means of defeating the enemy, and
nevertheless evade responsibility because there is no evidence state agents
directly instructed the commission of the specific massacre.
However, the ICJ has ultimately left the question of state liability for
ultra vires actions underspecified. "Effective control" appears to contemplate
state responsibility for an ultra vires act by a non-state actor in limited
circumstances. In both Nicaragua and Bosnian Genocide, the ICJ held that
the state needs to have "effective control" over the operation during which
the violations occur in order to trigger a finding of attribution under this
standard-mentioning nothing about control over the acts (or violations)
themselves.4 8 The choice to focus the inquiry on control over the operation,
Genocide Mean?, 91 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 833, 834-35 (2009) (describing the two separate
mental elements of the genocide offense).
46. The Bosnian Genocide opinion suggests that to satisfy the effective control test there must
be evidence a state directly instructed a non-state group to carry out the specific operation during
which the violation took place. Bosnian Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. TT 408, 410-12. This appears to set
a higher evidentiary standard than the ILC proposes in the Draft Article Commentaries for Article 8.
In its formulation of the factors required to establish effective control, the ILC treats the terms
"instructions," "directions," and "control" as disjunctive. Id ¶ 398. The commentaries thus suggest
that directions, instructions, or control are independently sufficient for a finding of state
responsibility under Article 8. In the ICJ's formulation of the same factors, however, the court reads
"instructions" back into the control test, so that instructions are always necessary for a finding of
effective control. Id. ¶ 413. Under this standard, courts may even have the flexibility to construe
the term operation so narrowly as to foreclose the possibility of holding a state responsible for the
ultra vires actions of its non-state partners.
47. A similar analysis might apply in a case involving an unorganized group of individuals
carrying out specific operations on behalf of a state. If the non-state actor does not meet the Tadid
threshold of organization, non-state actors must meet the effective or strict control test for state
attribution.
48. Nicaragua, Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 115 (June 27) ("For this conduct to give rise to legal
responsibility of the United States, it would in principle have to be proved that that State had
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rather than the act, suggests that a state could be held responsible for ultra
vires acts that take place in the course of an operation over which that state
exercises effective control.
By contrast, the ILC, which endorses the ICJ's "effective control"
standard (as articulated in Nicaragua),4 9 limits liability for ultra vires acts
during operations over which a state exercises "effective control" to those
that are "an integral part" of the operation.so It does not extend responsibility
to ultra vires acts that are only "incidentally or peripherally" associated with
an operation.t It explains that "[s]uch conduct will be attributable to the
State only if it directed or controlled the specific operation and the conduct
complained of was an integral part of that operation."5 2 It further explains,
"The principle does not extend to conduct which was only incidentally or
peripherally associated with an operation and which escaped from the State's
direction or control."
Indeed, some language in Bosnian Genocide and Nicaragua suggests
that a state by definition does not have "effective control" over an ultra vires
act.54 In other words, to attribute an act of a non-state actor to a state under
the "effective control" standard, the state must have instructed or directed the
specific act that constitutes the violation in question.
In sum, the ICJ's application of effective control risks narrowing the
scope of accountability to the point of rendering state-responsibility doctrine
ineffective. In Nicaragua and Bosnian Genocide, "effective control"
effective control of the military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged
violations were committed."); Bosnian Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. T 400.





54. See Bosnian Genocide, 2007 1.C.J. ¶ 400 ("It must however be shown that this 'effective
control' was exercised, or that the State's instructions were given, in respect of each operation in
which the alleged violations occurred .... ). One could interpret the "or" in this sentence as an
explanatory word. Nicaragua, Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, T 115 (June 27) ("All the forms of United
States participation [and control] mentioned above ... would not in themselves mean, without
further evidence, that the United States directed or enforced the perpetration of the acts contrary to
human rights and humanitarian law alleged by the applicant State."). One could interpret this
sentence to mean that "direction" and "enforcement" are necessary to find the state responsible.
55. This depends on how one defines "operation." Ifthe term "operation" is narrowly construed
to mean that each act that makes up an operation must be directed by the state (Tadid's reading),
then the state cannot be held responsible for acts that were not expressly instructed by the state.
However, if "operation" is construed so that several acts are steps in one operation, then it is possible
to be responsible for an ultra vires act under the ILC reading as long as the act in question is integral
to the operation ordered by the state. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in Tadi6 appears to have
interpreted Nicaragua and Bosnian Genocide in this manner. See Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A,
Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 106 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999)
("This [effective control] test hinged on the issuance of specific directives or instructions concerning
the breaches allegedly committed by the contras.").
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requires such a high degree of control and specificity of instructions that
states can-merely by issuing instructions at a relative level of generality-
easily avoid attribution for crimes as egregious as genocide.
The ICJ's approach to state responsibility thus leaves many unanswered
questions. It does permit the actions of non-state actors to be attributed to
states-and in this respect partially addressed the legal loophole created by
the possibility of states acting through non-state actors. But it adopted a
strict-liability rule that sets a very high evidentiary bar for triggering state
attribution. In doing so, the Court left a substantial accountability gap that,
taken alone, would permit states to escape legal limits on their own actions
by encouraging and enabling non-state actors to take action on their behest.
C. The ICTY's Overall Control Test
Eleven years after the ICJ's ruling in Nicaragua, the Appeals Chamber
of the ICTY also confronted the question of state attribution in Prosecutor v.
Dusko Tadie.5 6 In the case, the prosecutor brought a criminal suit against
Dusko Tadi6, a Bosnian Serb politician and member of a paramilitary group,
for "grave breaches" of international humanitarian law.s?
Because it was a criminal case, the stakes of a finding of attribution in
Tadid were somewhat different than in Nicaragua. In particular, finding
Tadid guilty hinged on whether international humanitarian law applied to the
parties to the conflict. After all, Tadid was charged with violating
international humanitarian law that applies during international armed
conflict-a charge that could only hold if the law was applicable to the
conflict. The ICTY's ability to find criminal liability thus hinged on the
attribution of paramilitary conduct against the state of Bosnia and
Herzegovina to a second state, the FRY-an attribution that would make the
conflict an international armed conflict (IAC) and would thereby trigger the
full panoply of international humanitarian laws applicable to such conflicts.
The threshold question was whether the acts of the VRS could be
attributed to the FRY. Since, as noted earlier, Republika Srpska was not a
recognized state, the conflict between Republika Srpska and Bosnia
Herzegovina-in which Tadid committed his offenses-was not an
international armed conflict. However, if the acts of the VRS could be
attributed to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (a recognized state), then
the conflict would be an international armed conflict between two states (the
FRY and Bosnia and Herzegovina). Members of the VRS could thus be held
accountable for the atrocities committed during the war under the stricter
56. Id T 131.
57. Id ¶ 68.
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standards of conduct that international humanitarian law imposes on
participants in international armed conflicts. 8
The Appeals Chamber explicitly rejected the application of the
Nicaragua "effective control" test to the facts of the case.59 It noted that the
purpose of Article 8 of the Draft Articles-an earlier version of which had
been adopted by the ILC drafting committee in 1998-was "to prevent States
from escaping international responsibility by having private individuals carry
out tasks that may not or should not be performed by State officials."60 As a
result, it declared that "[t]he degree of control [required for attribution]
may ... vary according to the factual circumstances of each case."61 In
particular, it observed that for organized groups, "it is sufficient to require
that the group as a whole be under the overall control of the State."62
In explaining this new "overall control" test, the Appeals Chamber
clarified that the State must not only "equip[] and financ[e]" the group, but
also "coordinat[e] or help[] in the general planning of its military activity." 63
Distinguishing the ICJ's effective control standard, the Appeals Chamber
58. This question came before the ICTY in 1994. Prosecutor v. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-T,
Trial Judgment, ¶ 7 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997). Article 2 of the
ICTY Statute empowers the Tribunal to "prosecute persons committing or ordering to be committed
grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions," including crimes that only arise in the course of an
IAC. Id. T 577. Since the prosecution indicted Dusko Tadid for conduct that only constitutes a
breach of the Geneva Conventions under IAC-IHL rules, the ICTY had to determine whether there
was an IAC. In order to satisfy the elements required to establish grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions-for Bosnian Muslims to be considered "protected persons" within the meaning of the
Geneva Conventions-the prosecution had to show that the victims were in the hands of a party to
the conflict of which they were not nationals (i.e., that the VRS perpetrators were agents or organs
of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia). In Tadie, the Trial Chamber recognized that there was an
IAC before May 19, 1992. Id. ¶ 569. It held, however, with the presiding judge dissenting, that
although "the JNA [the armed forces of the SFRY] played a role of vital importance in the
establishment, equipping, supplying, maintenance and staffing of the ... VRS units," the VRS was
not an organ or agent of the FRY [as successor to the SFRY]. Id TT 595, 607. As a result, the Trial
Chamber concluded that there was not an IAC, and so Tadid could not be found guilty of any of the
counts postdating May 19, 1992 that relied on Article 2 of the ICTY Statute. Id. ¶ 608. The
Prosecutor appealed this part of the judgment, claiming that even after May 19 there was an IAC
between the FRY and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, ¶ 85. The Prosecutor argued that only international humanitarian law (and not the law
of state responsibility) should be used to determine whether Article 2 of the statute applies. Id ¶¶
89, 103. Nevertheless, the Appeals Chamber held that international humanitarian law needed to be
supplemented by general international rules on control under the doctrine of state responsibility. Id.
TT 98, 103-05. The Appeals Chamber therefore turned to an analysis of the law of state
responsibility. Id TT 102-45.
59. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 115.
60. Id. T 117.
61. Id.
62. Id. ¶ 120 (emphasis added).
63. Id. ¶ 131; see also id. ¶ 137 ("The control required by international law may be deemed to
exist when a State (or, in the context of an armed conflict, the Party to the conflict) has a role in
organising, coordinating or planning the military actions of the military group, in addition to
financing, training and equipping or providing operational support to that group.").
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emphasized that the overall control test does not go so far as to require "the
issuing of specific orders by the State, or its direction of each individual
operation."64
In applying the test to the facts, the Appeals Chamber found that the
FRY exercised overall control over the VRS.65 It emphasized that:
The Yugoslav People's Army (the Army of the SFRY, which ceased
to exist with the creation of the Yugoslav Army (VJ) in April 1992)
officers were directly transferred into their equivalent postings in the
VRS;66
The FRY/VJ paid the salaries of these officers;67
The VJ had the same military objectives as the VRS;68
The FRY/VJ provided "extensive financial, logistical and other
assistance and support" to the VRS; 6 9 and
The FRY/VJ "directed and supervised the activities and operations of
the VRS."70
The VJ and the VRS "did not, after May 1992, comprise two separate
armies in any genuine sense."71
The Appeals Chamber held that there was an IAC and that Tadid was
therefore liable for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions under
Common Article 2 and Article 2 of the ICTY Statute.72
By using the overall control standard, the ICTY Appeals Chamber was
able to apply international humanitarian law applicable to international
armed conflicts to the facts of Tadid and reject efforts to evade international
criminal responsibility. Ultimately, the Appeals Chamber held that in cases
involving organized, armed military groups, evidence the state exercised a
more general level of control over the non-state group is sufficient to attribute
the groups' conduct to a state.
Moreover, the overall control test, as articulated by the ICTY, is a strict-
liability standard: Once a non-state actor is considered to be under the overall
control of a state, the state is responsible for all acts, including ultra vires acts
carried out by the non-state actor. If the test is regarded as a test for whether
a group is functionally an organ of the state, this standard makes intuitive








72. Id. TT 162, 171.
73. Id. ¶M 120-22.
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sense. There is little question that a state is responsible for an ultra vires act
committed by its de facto organ. Article 7 of the Draft Articles provides:
"The conduct of an organ of a State ... shall be considered an act of the State
under international law .. . even if [the organ] exceeds its authority or
contravenes instructions."74 The ILC Commentary also points to an
abundance of state practice and judicial decisions supporting this notion. In
fact, both the ICJ76 and the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY 7 7 have come to a
similar conclusion.
Indeed, many scholars have praised the overall control test precisely
because it adopts a more capacious test for establishing state responsibility
for the actions of non-state actors. The ICRC has expressly endorsed the
overall control test as the appropriate standard in armed conflict, not only for
purposes of classifying the conflict, but also for attributing state
responsibility for the conduct of non-state actors.78 Commentators have also
noted the utility of the lower standard of attribution in the context of state-
74. Draft Articles, supra note 12, at art. 7.
75. Id. at art. 7 cmts. 3-7.
76. Bosnian Genocide, Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, TT 385-86 (Feb. 26); Nicaragua, Judgment,
1986 I.C.J. 14, 1109 (June 27).
77. Tadi6, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 121.
78. Acknowledging that the ICTY's overall control test is the minority position, the ICRC
nevertheless contends that it is the appropriate test in armed conflicts for several reasons:
In order to classify a situation under humanitarian law involving a close relationship,
if not a relationship of subordination, between a non-State armed group and a third
State, the overall control test is appropriate because the notion of overall control better
reflects the real relationship between the armed group and the third State, including for
the purpose of attribution. It implies that the armed group may be subordinate to the
State even if there are no specific instructions given for every act of belligerency.
Additionally, recourse to the overall control test enables the assessment of the level of
control over the defacto entity or non-State armed group as a whole and thus allows
for the attribution of several actions to the third State. Relying on the effective control
test, on the other hand, might require reclassifying the conflict with every operation,
which would be unworkable. Furthermore, the test that is used must avoid a situation
where some acts are governed by the law of international armed conflict but cannot be
attributed to a State.
ICRC, supra note 10, at art. 3, T 409 (citations omitted).
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sponsored terrorism,79 private military and security contractors,80 and non-
state paramilitary groups.
Despite these advantages, the ICTY's overall control test has not been
widely embraced. Instead, the effective control standard is regarded by many
observers as the governing standard.82 In updating the Draft Articles, the ILC
expressly supported the ICJ's effective control standard in the final text and
commentary, leaving its assessment of the overall control test's viability
ambiguous. In the 2007 Bosnian Genocide case, moreover, the ICJ rejected
the overall control standard and reaffirmed the effective control standard it
79. KIMBERLEY N. TRAPP, STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:
PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 44 (2011); Antonio Cassese, The Nicaragua and Tadid Tests Revisited
in Light of the ICJ Judgment on Genocide in Bosnia, 18 EuR. J. INT'L L. 649, 666 (2007); Alison
Elizabeth Chase, Legal Mechanisms of the International Community and the United States
Concerning State Sponsorship of Terrorism, 45 VA. J. INT'L L. 41, 120, 123 (2004); W. Michael
Reisman, InternationalLegalResponses to Terrorism, 22 HOus. J. INT'L L. 3, 37, 39 (1999); Anne-
Marie Slaughter & William Burke-White, An International Constitutional Moment, 43 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 1, 20 (2002); Scott M. Malzahn, Note, State Sponsorship and Support of International
Terrorism: Customary Norms of State Responsibility, 26 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 83,
100-01 (2002). For more commentators making similar remarks, see TRAPP, supra, at 42 n. 111.
80. EVGENI MOYAKfNE, THE PRIVATIZED ART OF WAR: PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY
COMPANIES AND STATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR UNLAWFUL CONDUCT IN CONFLICT AREAS
275 (2015); Oliver R. Jones, Implausible Deniability: State Responsibility for the Actions ofPrivate
Military Firms, 24 CONN. J. INT'L L. 239, 271, 289 (2009); Amanda Tarzwell, Note, In Search of
Accountability: Attributing the Conduct ofPrivate Security Contractors to the United States Under
the Doctrine of State Responsibility, 11 OR. REV. INT'L L. 179, 204 (2009).
81. MOYAKINE, supra note 80, at 274; see id at 281-82 ("[T]he 'overall control' test appears
to be the most suitable one, while States, especially those hiring PMSCs [which can be equated with
paramilitary units], are likely to easily satisfy the set of criteria for the application of this test. It
will automatically lead to the attribution of their unlawful conduct to the States concerned if the
reasoning of the ICTY positioning its control theory as realistic is followed." (citations omitted));
Cassese, supra note 79, at 665-67.
82. See CRAWFORD, supra note 12, at 156 ("[The ICJ's determination in Bosnian Genocide]
effectively ends the debate as to the correct standard of control to be applied under Article 8.
Moreover it does so in a manner that reflects the ILC's thinking on the subject from the time the
term 'control' was introduced into then-Draft Article 8."); MOYAKINE, supra note 80, at 269
("[O]ne can draw the conclusion that he 'effective control' test is the leading theory according to
the World Court . . . "); Christian J. Tams, Law-making in Complex Processes: The World Court
and the Modern Law of State Responsibility, in SOVEREIGNTY, STATEHOOD AND STATE
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JAMES CRAWFORD 287, 301 (Christine Chinkin & Freya
Baetens eds., 2015) ("As a result, it would seem far-fetched today to suggest hat overall control is
sufficient to justify attribution of private conduct-faced with dissent the ILC-ICJ has struck back.").
83. Draft Articles, supra note 12, at art. 8 cmts. 3-5.
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had first established in Nicaragua.84  Unbowed, the ICTY has since
reaffirmed the overall control standard on at least two occasions.
Commentators generally present the ICJ's "effective control" and the
ICTY's "overall control" standards as alternatives.86 And in many ways, they
are: The ICJ and the ICTY each explicitly rejected the other court's approach
after characterizing the tests as standards of attribution under Article 8 of the
Draft Articles. In Tadid, the ICTY criticized the ICJ's "effective control"
standard from Nicaragua and proposed the "overall control" standard to
replace it in cases where the non-state actor is an organized group.8 7
Responding in Bosnian Genocide to the ICTY's appraisal, the ICJ criticized
the ICTY's "overall control" standard and reaffirmed the "effective control"
standard it had first established in Nicaragua (notwithstanding the non-state
actor's level of organization). In the commentary on Article 8, meanwhile,
the ILC itself took note of the dispute between the ICJ and ICTY.89 But the
ILC leaves room for reconciliation. The Draft Articles favorably cite the
effective control test and note that the ICTY's mandate was directed toward
84. While the ICJ acknowledged that "overall control" may well be the appropriate standard
for determining whether or not an armed conflict is international or not, the Court rejected its
application in the context of state-responsibility doctrine. Bosnian Genocide, Judgment, 2007 I.C.J.
43, ¶¶ 403-07 (Feb. 26). But see id. 39 ("The inherent danger in [the effective control test] is that
it gives States the opportunity to carry out criminal policies through non-state actors or surrogates
without incurring direct responsibility therefore.") (dissenting opinion by Al-Khasawneh, V.P.).
85. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, ¶ 26
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 20, 2001) (confirming that the "overall control"
standard articulated in Tadi6 was the applicable criteria in ascertaining the existence of an
international armed conflict); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Chamber
Judgment, ¶ 134 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000) (holding that the
question of Yugoslavia's responsibility for the acts of Bosnian Serb forces was subject to an "overall
control" test).
86. See, e.g., CRAWFORD, supra note 12, at 156 (noting critiques that the effective control test
sets the bar too high and the test of overall control "would better meet the needs of the international
community in dealing with the threat of terrorism"); Tams, supra note 82, at 301 (describing the
ICJ and ILC's defense of the effective control test against he ICTY's overall control test).
87. See Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 1 123 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) ("In the case under discussion here, that of organised groups,
State responsibility is instead the objective corollary of the overall control exercised by the State
over the group. . . . [T]he fact nevertheless remains that international law renders any State
responsible for acts in breach of international law performed (i) by individuals having the formal
status of organs of a State (and this occurs even when these organs act ultra vires or contra legem),
or (ii) by individuals who make up organised groups subject to the State's control. International
law does so regardless of whether or not the State has issued specific instructions to those
individuals. Clearly, the rationale behind this legal regulation is that otherwise, States might easily
shelter behind, or use as a pretext, their internal legal system or the lack of any specific instructions
in order to disclaim international responsibility.").
88. Bosnian Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. TT 403-07.
89. Draft Articles, supra note 12, at art. 8 cmts. 4-5.
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"issues of individual criminal responsibility, not state responsibility," but he
ILC does not expressly reject the overall control test.90
In sum, in the context of armed conflict, the ICJ and the ICTY have
relied primarily on two 91 standards for evaluating the level of control required
to attribute an act of a non-state actor to a state under the Draft Articles:
effective control and overall control. These two tests have traditionally been
understood as mutually inconsistent. Yet it is possible to see them as
reconcilable. According to the ICJ in Nicaragua, an act of a non-state actor
is attributable to a state if the state exercises "effective control" over the
operation during which the act occurred.92 Under the effective control
standard, private conduct that is merely supported, financed, planned, or
otherwise carried out on behalf of the state is not attributable unless the state
also exercises a high level of control "in respect of each operation in which
the alleged violations occurred."9 3  According to the ICTY in its Tadie
appeals judgment, however, in cases where the non-state actor is an
organized military group, the state only needs to exercise overall control over
the actor for the act to be attributable to the state.94 As long as the non-state
actor is organized, evidence that the state financed and equipped a "military
organization" and participated in the general planning of the group's
90. Id. at art. 8 cmt. 5. The ILC's commentary has itselfbeen the subject of significant scholarly
debate. The ILC concludes its assessment of the ICJ and ICTY's disagreement by noting that "it is
a matter for appreciation in each case whether particular conduct was or was not carried out under
the control of a State, to such an extent that the conduct controlled should be attributed to it." Id.
91. The ICJ also articulated the additional "strict control" standard, which establishes that all
of the acts of a non-state actor are attributable to a state if that non-state actor is in a relationship of
"complete dependence" on the state. Bosnian Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. ¶ 391 (asking "whether it is
possible in principle to attribute to a State conduct of persons-or groups of persons-who, while
they do not have the legal status of State organs, in fact act under such strict control by the State
that they must be treated as its organs for purposes of the necessary attribution leading to the State's
responsibility for an internationally wrongful act" (emphasis added)). In Nicaragua, the court uses
the phrase "complete dependence" to refer to the same control standard. Nicaragua, Judgment, 1986
I.C.J. 14, T 110 (June 27). The "strict control" standard is, on our view, the most stringent (i.e., the
most difficult for establishing attribution). Under strict control the accountability gap is therefore
also widest. Given our critique of the limitations of the arguably lower evidentiary burdens of
effective and overall control, we do not discuss strict control in detail in this paper.
92. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. ¶ 115 ("For this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the
United States, it would in principle have to be proved that that State had effective control of the
military or paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed.").
93. Bosnian Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. 1 400 (emphasis added). Admittedly, it is difficult to
ascertain the exact content of the effective control standard-thus far no court or tribunal has found
sufficient evidence of effective control to trigger state responsibility.
94. Tadie, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, T 131 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) ("In order to attribute the acts of a military or paramilitary group
to a State, it must be proved that he State wields overall control over the group .... ).
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operations is sufficient to establish state responsibility, even if the state did
not issue specific instructions.
These two approaches, moreover, might be seen as reflected in the ILC
Draft Articles, the overall control test addressing attribution under Article 4
and the effective control test addressing attribution under Article 8. Indeed,
a handful of commentators have suggested that the "overall control" standard
is best understood in terms of the legal theory of attribution underlying the
ICJ's control standard under Article 4, rather than under Article 8.96 Indeed,
this understanding of the relationship between the standards adopted by the
ICJ and the ICTY on the one hand, and the Draft Articles on the other, might
even make the best sense of current state-responsibility doctrine.97
Regardless of the standard, however, all these approaches share a
common vice: By drawing a bright line, they force a difficult-if not
impossible-decision as to how much control over a non-state actor is
enough to hold a state responsible for its actions. On the one hand, drawing
the line for triggering state responsibility too high allows states easily to
evade legal limits on their own actions. On the other hand, drawing it too
low can threaten to place states in an unfair position of being held liable for
actions they could not reasonably prevent. Both approaches, moreover, allow
95. Id. ¶ 145 ("In the case at issue, given that the Bosnian Serb armed forces constituted a
'military organization', the control of the FRY authorities over these armed forces required by
international law for considering the armed conflict to be international was overall control going
beyond the mere financing and equipping of such forces and involving also participation in the
planning and supervision of military operations. By contrast, international rules do not require that
such control should extend to the issuance ofspecific orders or instructions relating to single military
actions, whether or not such actions were contrary to international humanitarian law.").
96. E.g., Elena Laura Alvarez Ortega, The Attribution ofInternational Responsibility to a State
for Conduct of Private Individuals Within the Territory of Another State, REVISTA PARA EL
ANALISIS DEL DERECHO, January 2015, at 1, 22-23 (2015), http://www.indret.com/pdf/
1116_es.pdf [https://perma.cc/FWU4-72D9]; Claus Kress, L'Organe de Facto en Droit
International Public: Reflexions sur lImputation 6 l'Etat de l'Acte d'un Particulier i la Lumidre
des Ddveloppements Ricents, 105 REvUE GtNRALE DE DROIT INT'L PUB. 93, 131 (2001); Marko
Milanovid, State Responsibility for Acts ofNon-state Actors: A Comment on Griebel and Plicken,
22 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 307, 312-14, 316-19 (2009); Stefan Talmon, The Responsibility of Outside
Powers for Acts ofSecessionist Entities, 58 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 493, 506-07 (2009).
97. The Draft Articles Commentary discusses overall control as a standard of attribution under
Article 8. Draft Articles, supra note 12, at art. 8 cmt. 5. Nevertheless, a close reading of Tadid
reveals that the overall control standard assesses whether the conduct of the non-state actor can be
attributed to the state by virtue of the control it exercises over the group (Article 4), rather than the
specific operation (Article 8). In Tadid, because the Appeals Chamber found the non-state armed
group to be a de facto state organ, it classified the conflict as an international armed conflict
(effectively between two states) rather than a non-international armed conflict (between a state and
a non-state group). Like standards of attribution under Article 4, once the conduct of the state in
this case met the overall control threshold, all of the conduct of the non-state actor could be
attributed to it, regardless of whether the state had exercised a high level of control over particular
operations. In this sense, the overall control inquiry asks whether the non-state armed group in
question can be attributed to the state, and with it, all of the group's conduct.
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states to avoid responsibility for taking actions that enable non-state actors to
violate international law, as long as they stay far below the bar.
In the next Part, we examine more fully the incentives that modem
attribution doctrine creates for states, before turning in Part III to elaborating
a possible solution presented by Common Article 1 to the Geneva
Conventions.
II. Perverse Incentives
The bright-line approach to state responsibility that characterizes
modem attribution doctrine creates perverse incentives for states. First, the
high bar established by state-responsibility doctrine may encourage states to
use non-state partners to undertake actions that are prohibited to the states
themselves. This may be true even under the more capacious overall control
standard, for even that standard requires a significant level of state control
over the non-state actor before triggering responsibility. Second, the doctrine
may encourage states to hold non-state actors at arm's length-for instance,
providing them weapons but little training or instructions on compliance with
international humanitarian law-for fear that closer involvement might
trigger attribution. This is particularly true for those concerned about how
the overall control test may be applied, for that test creates a greater
likelihood that the state could be held responsible even for ultra vires actions.
A. The Incentive to Use Non-State Actors to Violate International Law
Consider the following possibility: Suppose a state supports a non-state
group seeking to overthrow its government. (This is no mere hypothetical:
Think, for example, of the many states supporting various non-state groups
at war in Syria.) The state would like to assure the victory of the side it
supports, but it would also like to avoid any responsibility for violations of
international law. It also knows that it would be prevented from sending in
its own troops unless the government of Syria were to give its permission-
unlikely if the non-state group it supports is seeking to topple the
government. Due tojus ad bellum concerns and domestic legal and political
limits on sending in the troops, the state may already prefer to send non-state
actors instead of its own armed forces.98 Because of the high bar established
98. States working through non-state actors are not immune from jus ad bellum constraints.
The Nicaragua Court found that "the mere supply of funds to the contras, while undoubtedly an act
of intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua, as will be explained below, does not in itself
amount to a use of force." Nicaragua, Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 228 (June 27). It nonetheless
indicated that "'organizing or encouraging the organization of irregular forces or armed bands ...
for incursion into the territory of another State', and 'participating in acts of civil strife . .. in another
State"' could, in some circumstances, violate the customary law prohibition on use of force. Id.
The potential violation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter was not before the Court, but the same
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by modem attribution doctrine, states in this circumstance may believe that
they can work through non-state actors and thereby avoid legal responsibility
that would be triggered if they employed their own forces.
It is undisputed that any and all acts of the state's armed forces would
be attributable to the state. Under Article 4 of the Articles on State
Responsibility, the armed forces of a state are widely considered "organs" of
the state.99 Therefore, any and all acts committed by the armed forces, even
if ultra vires, could be attributed to the state. So if a state's soldier goes rogue
and commits war crimes, the state would be directly responsible (a
responsibility it could discharge by court-martialing the offender).
Moreover, the rules of international law governing the conduct of the
state's armed forces impose substantial risks and burdens on the state. If a
state sends its own armed forces, their conduct is more likely to be governed
by the law that applies to international armed conflict. Those rules are, on
the whole, more comprehensive than the rules governing the behavior of non-
state actors in a non-international armed conflict. (For instance, non-state
actors do not need to treat captured government forces as POWs, entitled to
the full protections of the Geneva Conventions, though they are bound by the
humane-treatment obligations of Common Article 3.)
For a state in this position, working through a non-state actor may seem
an appealing alternative. Instead of sending the state's armed forces into the
conflict, the state might instead provide material support to the non-state
group fighting on its side of the conflict. Because of the accountability gap
left by modern attribution doctrine, the chances that the conduct of the non-
state actor will be attributed to the state are slim. Even the less generous
overall control standard allows states to provide significant support to non-
state actors without triggering legal responsibility.
States thus have ample incentives to capitalize on modern attribution
doctrine by using non-state actors as proxies to accomplish what international
law otherwise forbids. As a result, states may hope to act with impunity
through their non-state partners in situations where international law bars
states from acting themselves. This, in turn, renders some of the most
important international legal limits on states deeply vulnerable.
logic would suggest hat this prohibition applies to the overlapping Charter provision on the use of
force. Id.
99. See Draft Articles, supra note 12, at art. 4 ("The conduct of any State organ shall be
considered an act of that State under international law, whether the organ exercises legislative,
executive, judicial or any other functions .... An organ includes any person or entity which has
that status in accordance with the internal law of the State.").
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B. The Incentive Not to Exercise Control Over Non-State Actors
There is an additional set of perverse incentives created by the bright-
line approach of modem attribution doctrine: States may be reluctant to
exercise control over their non-state partners in ways that might minimize the
risk that they will violate international law. In fact, states might even be said
to have an incentive not to train and instruct non-state partners to comply
with international law. Training and instructing might serve as evidence that
the state exercised the level of control required to attribute the wrongful
conduct of non-state actors to the state. Again, this is true regardless of the
specific test applied, whether effective control or overall control.
Consider again a situation in which a state supports a non-state group
seeking to overturn its government. In an ideal world, the state would choose
to instruct and train the non-state actor to capture rather than kill enemies
who surrender, to refrain from torturing detainees, and to ensure the material
and procedural conditions of confinement do not render detention arbitrary-
both in order to comply with their Common Article 3 obligations and to avoid
mass atrocities and war crimes. However, engaging in such instruction and
training might bring the state closer to the strict-liability line. In particular,
this additional instruction and training-and the level of control required to
implement it-could tip the state over the bright line for attribution. The
state's efforts to comply with international humanitarian law could even
render it responsible for the non-state actor's ultra vires war crimes.
Under existing doctrine, states cannot mitigate responsibility for a non-
state actor's conduct once they have met the requisite threshold of control.
Furthermore, any and potentially all actions of the non-state actor-including
ultra vires actions-may be attributed to a state as if its own agents or organs
had performed them. State actors may therefore understandably be
concerned that more oversight over non-state actors (even in the form of ex
ante and ex post measures designed to encourage non-state actors'
compliance with the rule of law) will only bring states acting in good faith
closer to the attribution line. Once the control threshold has been reached,
current doctrine provides states with no explicit mitigation defense that
lessens the extent of liability.
Modem attribution doctrine arguably creates precisely the wrong
incentives. Where states do work with non-state actors to ensure compliance
with international norms, the law should decrease rather than increase the
possibility of attribution of internationally wrongful ultra vires acts,
encouraging states to take steps to mitigate and avoid violations. Indeed, the
common practice of international humanitarian organizations and NGOs-
which encourage states partnering with non-state actors to train leaders and
secure assurances of lawful conduct, among other recommendations-
suggests that an accountability regime that opens a state up to liability for
exercising due diligence vis-i-vis non-state partners may be
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counterproductive. In the next two Parts, we consider ways in which these
incentives might be significantly mitigated.
III. How to Fill the Gap: Common Article 1 Due Diligence Standard
Thus far this Article has examined modem attribution doctrine in
isolation. This has long been the approach to state responsibility. Here we
change course. We argue that, in the context of armed conflict, attribution
doctrine can only be properly understood in concert with other legal
frameworks-in particular, with the legal obligations created by international
humanitarian law. Indeed, Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions
provides a source of state responsibility for the actions of non-state actors
that cures many of the deficiencies of state attribution doctrine viewed on its
own. 100
This is a unique moment to embrace a broader and more integrated
understanding of state-responsibility doctrine, one that incorporates a robust
understanding of Common Article 1. On March 22, 2016, the International
Committee for the Red Cross issued its first revised commentaries on the
Geneva Conventions in more than six decades.10  These revised
commentaries adopt a broader vision of Common Article 1-a vision that, if
embraced by states, could cure many of the infirmities of state-responsibility
doctrine in the context of armed conflict. In particular, the Commentary of
2016 argues for a more robust reading of Common Article 1's "to ensure
respect" provision.1 02 On the ICRC's view, this clause entails both negative
duties "neither [to] encourage, nor aid or assist in violations of the
Conventions" and positive duties that High Contracting parties "must do
100. The obligations established in Common Article 1 operate in addition to, not in lieu of, the
rules on attribution in the Draft Articles. Article 55 of the Draft Articles provides that a more
specific rule on state responsibility may replace general rules on state responsibility codified in the
Draft Articles. Draft Articles, supra note 12, at art. 55. However, the ILC notes in its commentary
that this principle of lex specialis applies only when there is "some actual inconsistency between
[the rules]." Id. at art. 55 cmt. 4. Since there is no inconsistency between the obligations of
Common Article 1 and the rules on attribution in the Draft Articles, both are applicable. Indeed,
the ICJ in Nicaragua applied both Common Article 1 and the general rules on attribution.
Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J.¶I 109, 115, 220.
101. ICRC, supra note 10.
102. Id at art. 1. For the most directly relevant and significant contributions to the literature
on "to ensure respect" duties, see generally Fateh Azzam, The Duty of Third States to Implement
and Enforce International Humanitarian Law, 66 NoRDIC J. INT'L L. 55 (1997); Laurence Boisson
de Chazournes & Luigi Condorelli, Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions Revisited:
Protecting Collective Interests, 82 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 67 (2000); Carlo Focarelli, Common
Article I of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?, 21 EUR. J. INT'L L. 125 (2010); Frits
Kalshoven, The Undertaking to Respect and Ensure Respect in All Circumstances: From Tiny Seed
to Ripening Fruit, 2 Y.B. INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 3 (1999). For the articulation of ICRC staff that
most clearly anticipated the Commentary of 2016, see generally Knut Dormann & Jose Serralvo,
Common Article I to the Geneva Conventions and the Obligation to Prevent International
Humanitarian Law Violations, 96 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 707 (2014).
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everything reasonably in their power to prevent and bring such violations to
an end."10 3
This Part of the Article makes the case in three steps: First, it outlines
Common Article 1 obligations and explains the case law supporting the
extension of the duty to "ensure respect" to states' interactions with non-state
partners. Second, it explains the new 2016 ICRC Commentaries and their
decision to embrace an expansive vision of Common Article 1 obligations
that include a positive due diligence obligation on states working with non-
state actors. Third, it explains why Common Article 1, as interpreted in the
2016 Commentaries, promises to close the accountability gap left by modem
attribution doctrine and address the perverse incentives described in Part III.
A. Common Article 1 Duties Prior to the 2016 Commentaries
Common Article 1 provides: "The High Contracting Parties undertake
to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in all
circumstances."l04 The ICJ recognized that Common Article 1's "to ensure
respect" provision obligates state parties in both its Nicaragua judgment and
Wall advisory opinion. Despite this, Common Article 1 is often forgotten as
a source of legal obligation in discussions of state responsibility. However,
thanks to recent efforts by the International Committee for the Red Cross
advocating a more robust reading of Common Article l's "to ensure respect"
provision, viewing attribution doctrine in isolation is no longer possible.
A state's obligations under Common Article 1 are both broader and
narrower than its obligations under the Draft Articles. Common Article 1
obligations are broader because states' duties to "ensure respect" for the rules
set forth in the Geneva Conventions are distinct from-and arguably much
more extensive than-duties "to respect" the Conventions., 05 But Common
Article 1 obligations are narrower in that they only pertain to violations of
parties' duties under international humanitarian law. By contrast, the Draft
Articles address state responsibility for any "internationally wrongful act."
In the context of armed conflict, Common Article l's obligation on states "to
ensure respect" implies that states have a responsibility to make sure their
partner non-state actors abide by their IHL obligations,106 even when the
103. ICRC, supra note 10, at art. 1, T 154.
104. Geneva Convention I, supra note 9; Geneva Convention II, supra note 9; Geneva
Convention III, supra note 9; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 9; see also First Additional
Protocol, supra note 9.
105. For overview and discussion, see generally Boisson de Chazournes & Condorelli, supra
note 102; Birgit Kessler, The Duty to 'Ensure Respect' Under Common Article I of the Geneva
Conventions: Its Implications on International and Non-InternationalArmed Conflicts, 44 GERMAN
Y.B. INT'L L. 498 (2001).
106. In the 2016 Commentaries, the ICRC also explicitly adopts the view that non-state parties
to an armed conflict are bound by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. ICRC, supra
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state's relationship with the non-state actor falls short of standards of
attribution under the Draft Articles.
It is widely accepted that compliance with international humanitarian
law is the responsibility of parties to any international or non-international
armed conflict and that Common Article 1 is customary international law. 107
Duties "to respect" international humanitarian law apply directly to states and
their organs.o8 The relevant inquiry for determining whether a state is
responsible for a non-state actor's violations of "to respect" duties of
Common Article 1 thus concerns the degree to which actors or acts can be
seen as attributable to the state. The tests for state responsibility codified in
the Draft Articles and articulated in the jurisprudence of the ICJ and ICTY
also apply to liability for non-state actor violations of "to respect" duties
under Common Article 1.
1. The ICJ's "Not to Encourage" Standard.-In Nicaragua, the ICJ
refused to attribute the action of the Contras to the United States. But it then
went on to consider the applicability of an alternate source of legal
obligation-Common Article 1. It determined that the Common Article 1
duty to "ensure respect" also creates an obligation for the state not to assist
or "encourage" others (whether states or non-state actors) to violate their
obligations under the Geneva Conventions.109 It explained:
The Court considers that there is an obligation on the United States
Government, in the terms of Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, to
"respect" the Conventions and even "to ensure respect" for them "in
all circumstances" . .. The United States is thus under an obligation
not to encourage persons or groups engaged in the conflict in
Nicaragua to act in violation of the provisions of Article 3 common to
the four 1949 Geneva Conventions ... .110
note 10, at art. 1, ¶ 125. Additionally, the ICRC argues that non-state actors also incur duties "to
ensure respect" for Common Article 3 as it pertains to their members and those acting on their
behalf. Id. at art. 1, ¶ 132 ("[I]t follows from common Article 3, which is binding on all Parties to
a conflict, that non-State armed groups are obliged to 'respect' the guarantees contained therein.
Furthermore, such groups have to 'ensure respect' for common Article 3 by their members and by
individuals or groups acting on their behalf This follows from the requirement for armed groups
to be organized and to have a responsible command which must ensure respect for humanitarian
law. It is also part of customary international law." (citations omitted)).
107. 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT'L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 509-13 (2005).
108. See CRAWFORD, supra note 12, at 43 (providing, as an example, a ruling by the
International Court which stated that "[an act] will be considered as attributable to a State if and to
the extent that the [acts] that have been committed by organs or persons other than the State's own
agents were carried out, wholly or in part, on the instructions or directions of the State, or under its
effective control").
109. Nicaragua, Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 220 (June 27).
110. Id. (emphasis added).
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The ICJ held that the United States had violated this obligation by
publishing and distributing a manual on psychological operations that
encouraged the commission of IHL violations."' In applying this principle,
the ICJ noted that it evaluated whether the "encouragement" in question
pertained only to violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions,1 12 which creates obligations for both non-state actors and state
parties to armed conflict. With regard to the handbook, the ICJ found that
the United States encouraged the extrajudicial killing of noncombatants in
violation of Common Article 3.113 The ICJ thus explicitly distinguished
duties under Common Article 1 not to "incite" or "encourage" violations of
Common Article 3 from state responsibility for the actions of the paramilitary
groups.'14
The ruling indicates that the standard for finding responsibility for
violating the Common Article 1 duty to "ensure respect" is less stringent than
that of state responsibility for attribution of a non-state actor's acts. This
section of the opinion focuses on state "encouragement" rather than state
control.s15 The ICJ found that the United States knew of allegations that the
Contras were violating international humanitarian law and held that
knowledge of these allegations was sufficient to show the foreseeability of
future IHL violations by the non-state actor.1 16 Significantly, the ICJ found
a breach of customary international law duties even though the CIA framed
the manual as an attempt to moderate the IHL violations of the Contras.
In its compendium on the "rules of customary international
humanitarian law," the ICRC argues that state practice supports the ICJ's
ruling in Nicaragua. According to Rule 144 of the compendium, "States may
not encourage violations of international humanitarian law by parties to an
armed conflict. They must exert their influence, to the degree possible, to
111. Id. ¶ 256.
112. Id. TT 255-56.
113. Id.
114. See id 1 255 ("The question here does not of course relate to the definition of the
circumstances in which one State may be regarded as responsible for acts carried out by another
State, which probably do not include the possibility of incitement.").
115. Id. $ 256 ("[I]t is material to consider whether that encouragement was offered to persons
in circumstances where the commission of such acts was likely or foreseeable.").
116. Id ("When considering whether the publication of such a manual, encouraging the
commission of acts contrary to general principles of humanitarian law, is unlawful, it is material to
consider whether that encouragement was offered to persons in circumstances where the
commission of such acts was likely or foreseeable. The Court has however found (paragraph 121)
that at the relevant time those responsible for the issue of the manual were aware of, at the least,
allegations that the behaviour of the contras in the field was not consistent with humanitarian law;
it was in fact even claimed by the CIA that the purpose of the manual was to 'moderate' such
behaviour. The publication and dissemination of a manual in fact containing the advice quoted
above must therefore be regarded as an encouragement, which was likely to be effective, to commit
acts contrary to general principles of international humanitarian law reflected in treaties.").
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stop violations of international humanitarian law."' 17  In commentaries on
this rule, the ICRC argues that years of state practice also support a customary
international law obligation "not to encourage" violations of international
humanitarian law. While Nicaragua remains the clearest and most
compelling articulation of this standard, the ICRC and other scholars make a
strong case that state practice, ICTY cases, U.N. resolutions, and U.N.
committee reports support its judgment.'18
In sum, under Nicaragua, state encouragement of a non-state actor's
actions may be unlawful and trigger state liability under Common Article I
when it is "likely or foreseeable" that that the non-state actor will commit the
suggested violations. Even providing advice geared towards moderating a
non-state actor's violations of international humanitarian law could render a
state responsible for a violation of Common Article 1.119
2. Positive "Third-State" Obligations.-In its 2004 Wall Advisory
Opinion,12 0 the ICJ adopted an even more generous reading of Common
Article 1 than it had in Nicaragua. The ICJ found that the Article not only
imposed negative duties "not to encourage" abuses, but that the Article also
imposed some positive third-state obligations.121 Moreover, unlike negative
117. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 107, at 509.
118. Id. at 512 ("The Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia stated in its judgments .. . that the norms of international humanitarian law were norms
erga omnes and therefore all States had a 'legal interest' in their observance and consequently a
legal entitlement to demand their respect. State practice shows an overwhelming use of
(i) diplomatic protest and (ii) collective measures through which States exert their influence, to the
degree possible, to try and stop violations of international humanitarian law."). For additional
support that Common Article 1 and customary international law require states not to encourage
other states and non-state actors to violate international humanitarian law, see Azzam, supra note
102, at 69 (explaining that the scope of the duty of third states includes a duty not to encourage
offending states in further violations); Boisson de Chazoumes & Condorelli, supra note 102, at 68
("Some fifty years ago, the drafting of [the Geneva Conventions] led to the inclusion in their
common Article 1 of a provision that provides the nucleus for a system of collective
responsibility."); Kessler, supra note 105, at 498-99 (arguing that states' duties are more extensive
than a cursory interpretation of "ensure respect" might imply).
119. It remains unclear whether states that make a good faith effort to encourage non-state
actors to abide by international humanitarian law will still be held to violate their Common Article
1 duties. In Nicaragua, the ICJ found the United States liable for violating Common Article 1
because of a CIA manual that the United States claimed was intended to discourage the Contras
from violating international humanitarian law. Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. T¶ 255-56. The ICJ took the
manual's recommendations geared towards "mitigating" the violations of the Contras as evidence
that the United States knew future violations were "likely or foreseeable." The ICJ, however, also
found that the manual included additional recommendations that encouraged violations of
international humanitarian law. It remains unclear whether future courts will find good faith
instructions intended to mitigate non-state actors' IHL violations sufficient to violate Common
Article 1 duties absent additional "encouragements" to violate international humanitarian law.
120. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9) [hereinafter Wall Advisory Opinion].
121. Id ¶¶ 156-60.
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duties "not to encourage" that are owed to specific actors, the ICJ explained
that third-state obligations are erga omnes obligations owed to the
international community as a whole.122 Such obligations typically have been
construed as a general grant of authority for third states to act to ameliorate
grave breaches of the Conventions or otherjus cogens violationsl2 3 (including
breaches of the 1949 Genocide Convention).12 4 The ICJ interpreted Common
Article 1 to imply that "every state party" to the Fourth Geneva Convention
had an obligation to "ensure that the requirements" of the Convention are
upheld: "[E]very State party to that Convention, whether or not it is a party
to a specific conflict, is under an obligation to ensure that the requirements
of the instruments in question are complied with."1 25
In its application of this principle, the ICJ held that "all the States parties
to the Geneva Convention ... are under an obligation, while respecting the
United Nations Charter and international law, to ensure compliance by Israel
with international humanitarian law as embodied in that Convention."1 2 6 The
ICJ thus explicitly found that Common Article 1 imposed third-state
obligations on all High Contracting Parties to halt Israel's violation of the
Fourth Convention. Given that many state parties do not have direct ties to
Israel's military action in Palestine, the ICJ opinion implies that this duty
exists regardless of whether a state had provided support to Israel or
"encouraged" its violations.
In a separate opinion, Judge Kooijmans clarified that he disagreed with
the majority precisely because it interprets Common Article 1 as entailing
positive duties:
I simply do not know whether the scope given by the Court to
[Common Article 1] in the present Opinion is correct as a statement
of positive law.... I fail to see what kind of positive action, resulting
from this obligation, may be expected from individual States, apart
from diplomatic d6marches.127
The separate opinion helps elucidate two points: first, that the ruling
does impose some positive third-party obligations on states; and second, that
the scope of these obligations remains underspecified.
ICJ case law on Common Article 1 thus supports the conclusion that
Common Article 1 imposes not only negative duties "not to encourage"
violations of international humanitarian law, but also some minimal positive
122. Id. ¶ 157.
123. CHRISTIAN J. TAMS, ENFORCING OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
139-40 (2005).
124. Bosnian Genocide, Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶¶ 161-62 (Feb. 26).
125. Wall Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. T 158.
126. Id. 159.
127. Id. 50 (separate opinion by Kooijmans, J.) (emphasis added).
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third-state obligations. Considering the Nicaragua and Wall cases together,
it may be that Nicaragua indicates the "floor" or minimal conditions that
would suffice to establish a violation of the Common Article 1 duties "to
ensure respect." The Wall Advisory Opinion takes this a step further,
suggesting that third states might even be liable for their failure to take
preventative action against foreseeable IHL violations by other states.12 8
B. The 2016 ICRC Commentaries: Embracing a Positive Due Diligence
Obligation
On March 22, 2016, the ICRC released the first major new
commentaries on the Geneva Conventions since the famous 1952 Pictet
Commentaries.12 9 The release followed several years of preparations. In the
period preceding the release, the legal staff of the ICRC published
interpretations of the legal obligations under Common Article 1 under their
own names, providing a preview of the commentaries to come.130 These
initial releases provoked controversy and push-back by states, which caused
the release to be delayed by more than half a year.1' 3 1 The final release
promises to be a signal moment in the development of international
humanitarian law-and an important touchstone for understanding the legal
obligations of states under the Geneva Conventions for decades to come.
Building on Nicaragua and Wall, the ICRC legal staff argued in its
precommentary writings that duties "to ensure respect" should include
"positive" third-state obligations to prevent and halt other states and non-
state actors' violations of the Conventions.1 32  This proposed expansion
suggests only that states are required to take "all possible steps, as well as
any lawful means at their disposal" to "ensure" all other parties to armed
conflict respect the Geneva Conventions. 133 In contrasting its interpretation
of Common Article I with a narrower view, the ICRC's Commentary of 2016
also makes clear that states' duties "to ensure respect" extend to their
interactions with both states and non-state actors.134
128. See supra notes 125-127.
129. Launch of the Updated Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, ICRC (Apr. 6,
2016), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/launch-updated-commentary-first-geneva-convention
[https://perma.cc/XV52-K5BS].
130. Ddrmann & Serralvo, supra note 102.
131. Revisiting the Role of International Law in National Security: A "Papers" Workshop,
Cardozo Law School (May 19, 2016) (on file with author).
132. Ddrmann & Serralvo, supra note 102, at 707-09.
133. Id. at 724.
134. ICRC, supra note 10, at art. 1, ¶ 120 ("The interpretation of common Article 1, and in
particular the expression 'ensure respect', has raised a variety of questions over the last decades. In
general, two approaches have been taken. One approach advocates that under Article 1 States have
undertaken to adopt all measures necessary to ensure respect for the Conventions only by their
organs and private individuals within their own jurisdictions. The other, reflecting the prevailing
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Additionally, the ICRC legal staff and Commentary of 2016 argue that
a "due diligence" standard should apply when determining whether states
have discharged positive "to ensure respect" obligations.135 This standard
would impose obligations on the conduct of states, but does not require them
to attain specific outcomeS.136 States are not to be held responsible for
failures to prevent other states from violating the Conventions as long as they
can show that they "ma[d]e every effort" 137 to prevent the violation.138 The
view today and supported by the ICRC, is that Article 1 requires in addition that States ensure
respect for the Conventions by other States and non-State Parties.").
135. Ddrmann & Serralvo, supra note 102, at 724; ICRC, supra note 10, at art. 1, ¶ 165. Due
diligence is not a novel standard; international courts and commentators have relied on similar
standards under various international human rights frameworks. The Inter-American Court and the
European Court of Human Rights have interpreted similar "to ensure respect clauses" in their
respective human rights treaties as imposing positive due diligence obligations on states. See infra
note 149. Commentators have also argued states and corporations have positive due diligence
obligations in the context of corporate social responsibility. The Guiding Principles on Business
and Human Rights provide that positive obligations include, but are not limited to "human rights
due diligence," which requires business enterprises "to identify, prevent, mitigate and . .. [assess
responses to] adverse human rights impacts." U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R,
GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, at 17, U.N. Sales No. HR/PUB/l 1/04
(2011). The Guiding Principles also provide that states should take steps to prevent human rights
abuses by enterprises that are owned or controlled by the state, "or that receive substantial support
and services from State agencies." Id. at 6. Interestingly, in the context of corporate social
responsibility, some corporate counsel have raised concerns that exercising due diligence could
increase exposure to liability by making the company aware of potential risks, imposing positive
duties to mitigate. These concerns are not unlike some of the objections that detractors of a more
expansive reading of Common Article 1 might raise. In the context of corporate social
responsibility, the short response seems to be that these concerns are overstated. Due diligence
allows companies to "identify potential human rights risks and address them before they occur,
which should reduce the company's exposure to litigation of all kinds, and help the company defend
against human rights claims that might be filed." John F. Sherman III & Amy Lehr, Human Rights
Due Diligence: Is It Too Risky? 4 (Corp. Soc. Responsibility Initiative, Working Paper No. 55,
2010).
136. Dtrmann & Serralvo, supra note 102, at 723-25; see also ICRC, supra note 10, at art. 1,
¶ 165.
137. Riccardo Pisillo-Mazzeschi, The Due Diligence Rule and the Nature of the International
Responsibility ofStates, 35 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 9, 47-48 (1992).
138. ICRC legal commentators have been clear, however, that the general prohibition on the
use of force of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter provides the upper limit on actions states may take
to discharge their Common Article 1 obligations. Third-state obligations under Common Article 1
could not be used as a means to justify unilateral humanitarian interventions. See Dbrmann &
Serralvo, supra note 102, at 725-26 ("CA 1 should not be used to justify a so-called 'droit
d'ingdrence humanitaire'. In principle, permitted measures must be limited to 'protest, criticism,
retorsions or even non-military reprisals'. Armed intervention may only be decided within the
context of the UN, and in full respect of the UN Charter. The rules on the resort to armed force (fus
ad bellum) govern the legality of any use of force, even if it is meant to end serious violations of
international humanitarian law. The content of CA 1 is not part of jus ad bellum and thus cannot
serve as a legal basis for the use of force."). For an extended and speculative discussion of possible
options a state may take to discharge "to ensure" Common Article 1 duties, see generally Umesh
Palwankar, Measures Available to States for Fulfilling Their Obligation to Ensure Respect for
International Humanitarian Law, 34 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 9 (1994).
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ICRC publications foreshadowed the new commentaries on the Geneva
Conventions that also embrace these positive obligations of third states to
"ensure respect" of the Conventions by other states and non-state actors.13
9
Importantly, the ICRC embraces an interpretation of Common Article 1
obligations that, unlike attribution doctrine, does not establish a bright-line
rule. Indeed, the Commentary of 2016 makes it clear that duties to ensure
respect extend to state interactions with private persons, even when such
persons' conduct is "not attributable to the state."1 40  Instead, there is a
sliding scale that adjusts state legal obligations based on their degree of
connection and control.14 1 The Commentary of 2016 makes clear that duties
to ensure respect extend to any efforts to finance, equip, arm, or train the
armed forces of parties to a conflict.14 2  Prior to the release of the
commentaries, the ICRC legal staff additionally characterized third-state
duties as context-dependent obligations, which increase in scope according
to a state's engagement with a party to a conflict.143 Accordingly, significant
ties (whether diplomatic, geographic, social, or economic) between states
increase the due diligence responsibility that arises vis-A-vis other states and
non-state actors under the Common Article 1 obligation to ensure respect for
the Conventions.144
Even in the new commentaries, however, it is unclear whether and how
obligations based on "context" are derived from the third-party state's
capacity for influence in a given situation. On one reading, a state might
incur greater Common Article 1 obligations in any given conflict simply by
virtue of its pervasive worldwide military, economic, and diplomatic
influence.145 In alternative construction, a state might be required to take
voluntary steps to engage another state or non-state actor in order to comply
139. For the most directly relevant and significant contributions to the literature on "to ensure
respect" duties, see supra note 102.
140. ICRC, supra note 10, at art. 1, ¶ 150 (emphasis added). ("The duty to ensure respect covers
not only the armed forces and other persons or groups acting on behalf of the High Contracting
Parties but extends to the whole of the population over which they exercise authority, i.e. also to
private persons whose conduct is not attributable to the State. This constitutes a general duty of due
diligence to prevent and repress breaches of the Conventions by private persons over which a State
exercises authority . . . ." (citations omitted)).
141. See id at art. 1, 1 167 ("The duty to ensure respect for the Geneva Conventions is
particularly strong in the case of a partner in a joint operation, even more so as this case is closely
related to the negative duty neither to encourage nor to aid or assist in violations of the Conventions.
The fact, for example, that a High Contracting Party participates in the financing, equipping, arming
or training of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict, or even plans, carries out and debriefs
operations jointly with such forces, places it in a unique position to influence the behaviour of those
forces, and thus to ensure respect for the Conventions.").
142. Id.
143. Dbrmann & Serralvo, supra note 102, at 723-25 (citing Bosnian Genocide, Judgment,
2007 I.C.J. 43, T 430 (Feb. 26)).
144. Id. at 725.
145. Id. at 724.
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with its Common Article 1 due diligence obligations. At the very least, direct
support for another state's involvement in an armed conflict would increase
a third state's responsibility under Common Article 1. The lack of clarity on
the scope of the obligation has been part of the reason states have been slow
to embrace the new commentaries on this point.
C. Closing the Gap
The Commentary of 2016 supports a reading of Common Article 1 as
entailing positive obligations for states regarding the conduct of non-state
actors. There is good reason to embrace this reading. First, the text,
commentary, and case law support it. Second, applying due diligence
obligations to states working with non-state actors would close much of the
accountability gap otherwise left by state-responsibility doctrine.
The text of Common Article 1 itself offers no basis for distinguishing
between state actors and non-state actors.14 6 The Article simply provides that
"[t]he High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for
the present Convention in all circumstances."1 47 This entails duties to ensure
respect by other State Parties. But non-state actors also have both legal rights
and legal responsibilities under Common Article 3. Hence, the best reading
of Common Article 1 is that offered by the ICRC: the duty to "ensure respect"
ought to be read to require states to ensure respect by state and non-state
actors engaged in armed conflict.
Existing case law supports this reading of Common Article 1. The ICJ
in Nicaragua concluded that states have some Common Article 1 duties
toward non-state actors.14 8 This reading finds support, moreover, in related
case law by the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights. Both have interpreted their respective conventions,
which contain similar duty "to ensure" language, to impose affirmative "due
146. For the idea that third-state obligations apply to states and non-state parties alike, see
Dieter Fleck, International Accountability for Violations ofthe lus in Bello: The Impact oftheICRC
Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law, 11 J. CONFLICT & SECURITY L. 179, 182
(2006) ("[The obligation to ensure respect] extends to acts of third states, not directly involved in
an armed conflict, in their relations to state and non-state parties to the conflict."); see also Hannah
Tonkin, Common Article I: A Minimum Yardstick for Regulating Private Military and Security
Companies, 22 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 779, 783 (2009) ("According to the ICRC, [the obligation to
ensure respect] imposes a legal obligation not only on the parties to the armed conflict, but also on
third states not involved in the conflict.").
147. Geneva Convention I, supra note 9, at art. 1.
148. Nicaragua, Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 1220 (June 27) ("The Court considers that there is
an obligation on the United States Government, in the terms of Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions,
to 'respect' the Conventions and even 'to ensure respect' for them 'in all circumstances' .... ).
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diligence" obligations on state parties for the conduct of non-state actors
within their territory.14 9
Commentators have similarly argued that there are "due diligence"
obligations under Common Article 1,150 in particular with regard to the use
of private military and security contractors by states.51 Additionally, other
scholars have suggested affirmative due diligence obligations extend to the
context of U.S. support for paramilitary groups in Syria.152 Hannah Tonkin
argues that a state's due diligence obligations towards the conduct of private
military and security contractors will vary with context.153 In her analysis,
three factors are relevant for determining a state's due diligence
requirements: the level of control a state exercises over the non-state actor,
the risk the non-state actor will violate international humanitarian law, and
the state's actual or constructive knowledge of this risk.154 Arguably, a state
dealing with a non-state actor will need to take additional measures to ensure
compliance with international humanitarian law when any one of these
factors is present to a significant degree.
Applying the ICRC reading of the "to ensure respect" provision of
Common Article 1 significantly ameliorates the gap in current state-
responsibility doctrine. Unlike the attribution framework of the Draft
Articles, Common Article 1 creates obligations for states to ensure
compliance even when they do not exercise effective or overall control over
a non-state actor. As erga omnes obligations, states owe Common Article 1
duties not only to the particular parties to an armed conflict but also towards
the international community as a whole.155 Moreover, Common Article l's
149. Keenan v. United Kingdom, 2001-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 93, 128, ¶ 89; Alonso Eug6nio da Silva
v. Brazil, Case 11.598, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Report No. 9/00, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.106, doc. 3 rev.
¶ 40 (2000).
150. Dormann & Serralvo, supra note 102, at 708-10.
151. HANNAH TONKIN, STATE CONTROL OVER PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY
COMPANIES IN ARMED CONFLICT 136 (2011) ("If the host state does not take adequate measures to
control a PMSC and the company violates IHL in state territory, the state could incur international
responsibility for its failure to ensure respect for IHL. Although no court to date has found a state
responsible under Common Article 1 merely on the basis of such inaction, the above analysis has
shown that this pathway to responsibility is certainly possible in principle.").
152. Nathalie Weizmann, What Happens IfAmerican-Trained Rebels Commit War Crimes?,
JUST SECURITY (Aug. 18, 2015, 1:00 PM), https://www.justsecurity.org/25469/responsible-
american-trained-rebels-commit-war-crimes/ [https://perma.cc/6UXW-82M9].
153. Tonkin, supra note 146, at 794-95.
154. Id. at 794 ("Just as the measures necessary to discharge the due diligence obligation may
vary between states, so too may the measures required of a particular state vary with the
circumstances. Three factors are particularly pertinent to this assessment: first, the level of influence
or control that the hiring state in fact exercises over the PMSC in question; second, the risk that the
company's activities will give rise to a violation of IHL; and third, the state's actual or constructive
knowledge of that risk.").
155. ICRC, supra note 10, at art. 1, ¶ 119 ("Moreover, the proper functioning of the system of
protection provided by the Conventions demands that States Parties not only apply the provisions
5752017]
Texas Law Review
text stipulates that the High Contracting Parties must ensure respect for the
Conventions "in all circumstances."l56 As a result, these obligations do not
have a geographic or temporal threshold: Common Article 1 duties apply to
any and all state interactions with a non-state actor whenever the Geneva
Conventions are applicable.
A breach of Common Article 1 duties differs from a finding of
attribution liability. The Commentaries of 2016 rightly characterize
Common Article 1 duties and state-responsibility doctrine as "operat[ing] at
different levels."1 57 States failing to discharge their duties to ensure respect
by partner non-state actors would be found responsible for violating their own
international legal obligations. Instead of imputing the actions of the non-
state actor to the state, Common Article 1 creates a direct duty on the part of
a state to ensure respect by non-state actors. For example, when a state's
non-state partner commits war crimes in violation of its Common Article 3
obligations, a state would be held responsible for breach of its Common
Article 1 duties, not for the war crimes themselves. To take a simple analogy,
the difference between attribution doctrine and Common Article 1 is akin to
the difference between holding a company responsible for the actions of an
employee because those actions can be attributed, or imputed, to the company
and holding a company responsible for failing to take steps to prevent its
employees from taking certain actions.
Because Common Article 1 places direct duties on states, it establishes
"more stringent conditions than those required for the secondary rules on
State responsibility for aiding or assisting."158 State support that facilitates
non-state groups' ability to commit violations of international humanitarian
law constitutes an independent violation of the state's Common Article 1
duties, even if such actions may not pass the attribution bar under state-
responsibility doctrine.15 9
themselves, but also do everything reasonably in their power to ensure that the provisions are
respected universally. The Conventions thus create obligations erga omnes partes, i.e. obligations
towards all of the other High Contracting Parties." (citations omitted)).
156. Id. ¶ 145 ("The novelty of the provision lies in the addition of the duty to 'ensure respect',
which must be done 'in all circumstances'. This sets a clear standard, as 'ensuring' means 'to make
certain that something will occur or be so' or inversely 'make sure that (a problem) does not occur'.
States are thus required to take appropriate measures to prevent violations from happening in the
first place. Accordingly, the High Contracting Parties must-starting in peacetime-take all
measures necessary to ensure respect for the Conventions." (citations omitted)).
157. Id. 1160.
158. Id. ("Common Article 1 and the rules on State responsibility thus operate at different
levels. The obligation to ensure respect for the Conventions is an autonomous primary obligation
that imposes more stringent conditions than those required for the secondary rules on State
responsibility for aiding or assisting.").
159. Id ("Financial, material or other support in the knowledge that such support will be used
to commit violations of humanitarian law would therefore violate common Article 1, even though
576 [Vol. 95:539
Ensuring Responsibility
This broad application of Common Article 1 duties would require states
to make respect of international law a major focus of their interactions with
non-state actors in armed conflicts. In fulfilling their Common Article 1 "to
ensure respect" obligations, states would be required to take affirmative steps
to ensure their non-state partners complied with relevant law. Failures to
properly instruct and train non-state partners in their international law
obligations could thus be construed as a violation of a state's Common
Article 1 duties.
Under the proposed framework of the 2016 Commentaries, states have
obligations to take significant action towards insuring international law
compliance in at least two ways. First, following Nicaragua, states must
adequately assess whether assisting a non-state actor is likely or foreseeable
to lead to violations of the Geneva Conventions; if a state's assistance to a
non-state actor will enable violations of the Conventions, Common Article 1
requires that they forgo offering such assistance.160 Second, when states do
engage in partnerships with non-state actors in armed conflicts, Common
Article 1 requires that, even in relatively low-level engagements (supplying
equipment, providing arms, or sharing intelligence), states must exercise due
diligence and take affirmative steps to ensure the non-state actors comply
with the Geneva Conventions.16 1
Common Article 1 has the potential to eliminate the perverse incentive
for states to avoid fully engaging with non-state partners as a means of
skirting responsibility for violations of the laws of armed conflict: the very
failure to ensure non-state-actor compliance with international law could-
even absent a finding of state control-still be the basis of state liability.
Moreover, any deliberate effort to use a non-state actor to engage in conduct
that violates the Conventions would clearly violate Common Article 1.
Common Article 1 duties thus encourage states to make compliance with the
Geneva Conventions a central feature of their broader foreign policy agendas.
In sum, Common Article 1, as interpreted by the ICRC in its new
commentaries, promises to close much of the state-responsibility gap
identified in Part III. Common Article 1 requires states to exercise due
diligence to ensure that their non-state-actor partners respect international
law, even if the level of control they exercise falls short of what would be
necessary to trigger modem attribution doctrine. These Common Article 1
duties are not only important as a set of stand-alone obligations. They help
it may not amount to aiding or assisting in the commission of a wrongful act by the receiving States
for the purposes of State responsibility.").
160. See supra section III(A)(1) for a discussion of a state's responsibility not to encourage or
assist a non-state actor in the commission of acts that violate international humanitarian law.




alleviate the perverse incentives that can otherwise be created by modem
attribution doctrine's bright-line rule.
IV. Getting the Incentives Right: An Affirmative Defense
There is just one problem: States seeking to comply with their Common
Article 1 duties might fear triggering liability under attribution doctrine.
While Common Article 1 duties may be discharged under a due diligence
framework-in which adequate effort to discharge a duty would shield a state
from liability-overall control and potentially effective control function as a
regime of strict liability under which even ultra vires acts may be
attributed.16 2 In other words, a state seeking to meet its due diligence
obligations under the ICRC's reading of Common Article 1 might trip over
the bright line drawn by attribution doctrine.
As a result, even states that do not intend to use non-state actors to skirt
their international responsibilities may be reticent to embrace a reading of
Common Article 1 that imposes positive due diligence obligations to curb
potential violations of international humanitarian law by non-state partners.
States are likely to be concerned that measures taken to discharge Common
Article 1 obligations may contribute to breaching the attribution threshold.
Under the strict and overall control standards, once the state meets the
requisite level of control, all of the conduct of non-state actors-including
ultra vires actions-can be imputed to the state regardless of the kinds of
measures the state took to prevent violations. Under the effective control
standard, at least some of the ultra vires conduct of non-state partners may be
imputed to the state. The ILC has clarified that under Article 8, a state may
be held responsible for ultra vires acts during operations over which a state
exercises "effective control," as long as those acts are "an integral part" of
the operation.1 63 However, it does not extend responsibility to ultra vires acts
that are only "incidentally or peripherally" associated with an operation.1 64
This example illustrates yet again how the strict-liability regime of attribution
doctrine can create incentives for states not to provide IHL training and
instructions to non-state actors.
The perverse incentives for good faith actors become particularly
apparent when we consider the types of factors that courts and commentators
examine to establish attribution: support, training, instructions, and strategic
guidance. All four overlap with the kinds of activities states are expected to
use to discharge their Common Article 1 due diligence duties when they
partner with non-state armed groups. This raises the distinct possibility that
162. For a discussion of liability for ultra vires action under effective control, see supra notes
46-55 and accompanying text.




measures taken by a state to encourage non-state actors to comply with
international humanitarian law will render the state responsible for any
violations non-state actors commit in the course of an operation. This
potential for liability means states are likely to oppose a reading of Common
Article 1 that risks making them responsible for the ultra vires actions of non-
state groups without any possibility of mitigation.
To address this problem, states ought to be permitted to offer an
affirmative defense in cases where actions taken to address Common
Article 1 due diligence obligations push them over the bright line for state
attribution. Practically speaking, states should be able to invoke such a
defense if they are ever brought before an international or domestic court, a
human rights body, a special rapporteur, or even if their conduct is simply
being assessed by the court of public opinion. The concern is that key
evidence of control over a non-state actor could rely on measures taken by a
state to prevent violations of international humanitarian law by the non-state
actor. In a case where a state has taken measures to avoid certain IHL
violations by the non-state actor, the state should not be held legally
responsible for those ultra vires violations. Here we explain how such a legal
innovation would work.
A. An Affirmative Defense to Liability for Ultra Vires Actions
In order to resolve the perverse incentive problem, we propose an
affirmative defense to state liability. In particular, measures taken to fulfill
Common Article 1 obligations may be offered as an affirmative defense when
determining whether ultra vires conduct is attributable to the State, whether
under the effective control or overall control standard. States would have
more incentive to embrace positive obligations under Common Article 1 and
to take action to encourage non-state actors to comply with their IHL
obligations (for example, offering IHL training to non-state actors).
We are not proposing a change to the law on state responsibility. Instead
of modifying the legal standard of effective control, international courts
would recognize an affirmative defense in line with the spirit of the current
attribution framework. This has the advantage of leaving the attribution
framework intact, but allows states to embrace the positive obligations under
Common Article 1 without thereby triggering liability for ultra vires actions
under attribution doctrine.
A comparison to domestic law in the context of Title VII vicarious
liability for supervisor harassment offers insight into how this would work.165
165. We are only offering a loose analogy to illustrate our argument; vicarious liability in the
context of domestic employment obviously features a number of elements that differ widely from
the context of accountability for non-state-actor conduct in the context of armed conflict.
2017] 579
Texas Law Review
In Burlington Industries v. Ellerth1 6 6 and Faragher v. City ofBoca Raton,167
the Supreme Court found that employers could be subject to vicarious
liability under Title VII to a harassed employee for actionable discrimination
caused by a supervisor.1 68 In Ellerth, however, the Court allowed employers
to raise an affirmative defense to vicarious liability. The defense requires
two necessary elements: (1) that "the employer exercised reasonable care to
prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior," and (2) that
"the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
harm otherwise."1 6 9 The first prong of the Ellerth test is directly analogous
to the state responsibility context: States that can show they adequately
exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct non-state-actor violations of
the Geneva Conventions should be able to avoid liability for some non-state-
actor ultra vires actions.
Adopting this affirmative defense strikes the right balance between
accountability and states' concerns about liability risk from positive
Common Article 1 obligations. The affirmative defense would only allow
states to avoid liability for a narrow set of actions committed by non-state
actors: ultra vires actions that violate international humanitarian law and are
taken against states' efforts to ensure non-state-actor compliance with
international law. Because it is framed as an affirmative defense, the burden
would fall on states to prove that they had adequately discharged their
Common Article 1 duties in an effort to avoid the violations. The test thus
parallels the domestic example above: a defense to employer liability for
supervisory actions requires employers to take adequate steps to ensure
supervisors were aware of what actions would constitute harassment.
Moreover, when a state is found to exercise control over a non-state
group, the state would not be able to use the affirmative defense to escape
liability for the group's violations of international humanitarian law if the
state: (1) directly instructed the group to commit the violations, or (2) failed
to take reasonable steps to insure against the violations. Thus, even with the
option of raising an affirmative defense, states could still be held liable for
some ultra vires actions taken by a non-state actor. Additionally, as discussed
in detail below, the affirmative defense would ameliorate states' concern
about liability for actions done against their instructions; even when a state
exercises effective or overall control over a non-state group, proper discharge
of its Common Article 1 duties offers a shield against ultra vires liability.
166. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
167. 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
168. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (holding that an "employer is subject to vicarious liability to
a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor"); Faragher,
524 U.S. at 807 (same).
169. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 745.
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Ultimately, this affirmative defense would encourage states to freely sponsor
and implement such IHL training programs, without any fear that such
programs would be used against them when trying to establish attribution.1 70
How would this play out in practice? Consider again the not-so-
hypothetical case, described above, in which a state supports a non-state
group seeking to overthrow its government. Imagine that the state engages
in a substantial training program intended to ensure that the members of the
non-state group not engage in IHL violations. The training program brings
all members of the non-state group together to a camp run by the state's
armed forces. There, the state's armed forces integrate international
humanitarian law into their training in ways that are meaningfully intended
to inform the non-state actors about international humanitarian law. They
also require members of the non-state group that seek to receive the state's
support to sign declarations in which they commit to abide by international
humanitarian law (declarations that are meaningfully calculated to be
understood by those signing them-written in their own language and read
out loud to those who are illiterate). To take these actions, the state will have
provided extra financing to the armed group (by financing the training
program) and exercised more managerial control over the non-state actor (by
bringing all members of the group to one location and running the program).
Moreover, the state will probably also have given more specific directions to
the non-state actor (e.g., "Do not attack this village because there are too
many innocent civilians.").
After this training program, imagine that the non-state actor still
commits ultra vires IHL violations, and an international court, rapporteur,
investigative body, or other authority must decide whether the ultra vires
conduct of the non-state actor is attributable to the state. In this case, the
applicable legal standard for state attribution would apply--overall control
or effective control. However, if the state could offer a good faith
demonstration that the training program was undertaken to discharge its
Common Article 1 duties, it could argue that this provides an affirmative
170. It is important to note that in the ICJ's Bosnian Genocide judgment, the court appears to
suggest hat ultra vires actions may not be attributable to states under the effective control test. This,
however, is an evidentiary issue: the opinion implies that only evidence of direct instructions from
the officers of a state to the non-state actor in the prelude to an internationally wrongful act will
suffice as the basis for attribution. The effect of this evidentiary rule, however, is to effectively
foreclose the possibility of a finding of attribution for an ultra vires act. Only acts for which there
is evidence that the state ordered them are potentially ripe for attribution. An affirmative defense
would be unnecessary in this context. The Commentary to the Articles on State Responsibility, on
the other hand, leaves open the possibility of attribution of ultra vires acts to the state under effective
control. It is difficult to weigh the relative authority of the ICJ and the ILC against each other, with
the result that one could plausibly apply either articulation of the standard. The applicability of the
affirmative defense, however, avoids the question of relative authority entirely: states can offer the
affirmative defense of discharging Common Article 1 duties even if a court had made a
determination that effective control already existed.
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defense to attribution of the ultra vires conduct-particularly where the
training program constitutes a significant source of the evidence that the state
exercises the level of control required to trigger attribution.
B. A Solution for Good Faith Actors
The affirmative defense is an ideal solution for "good faith actors" (i.e.,
states that engage with non-state actors for reasons beyond just trying to
avoid responsibility). The affirmative defense would allow them to take
reasonable steps to ensure that armed non-state groups with whom they work
abide by their IHL obligations. Because any good faith measure they take to
fulfill their Common Article 1 obligations would support an affirmative
defense against attribution of ultra vires actions, they would have less reason
for concern that taking such measures would push them across the attribution
threshold.
Not only would the affirmative defense encourage states to fulfill their
Common Article 1 obligations, but it would also encourage states to
recognize the applicability of the Common Article 1 obligation "to ensure
respect" to their relationships with non-state actors. One of the reasons States
may resist the ICRC interpretation of the positive obligation "to ensure
respect" is a fear that taking action to satisfy these obligations could trigger
additional responsibilities. Since the affirmative defense would ameliorate
this problem, it would reduce states' objections to the ICRC interpretation on
this ground. The net consequence is that there would be greater recognition
of and compliance with the "to ensure respect" obligation under Common
Article 1.
C. A Solution for Bad Faith Actors
The affirmative defense does not close the accountability gap that under
existing state-responsibility doctrine advantages what we could call "bad
faith actors": states that deliberately use non-state actors to commit acts they
themselves could not legally do, in order to evade legal responsibility.
Because of the high substantive and evidentiary bars for a finding of
attribution under the effective and overall control standards, bad faith actors
can provide significant support to a non-state actor engaged in internationally
wrongful acts without triggering a finding of attribution. These states would,
however, be liable for violating their Common Article 1 duties to ensure
respect for the Geneva Conventions.
According to the ICRC, the duty to ensure respect under Common
Article 1 also imposes due diligence obligations on states to prevent
violations of international humanitarian law. 17 1  This interpretation of
171. ICRC, supra note 10, at art. 1, ¶¶ 164-73.
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Common Article 1 may provide even bad faith actors with an incentive to
take prophylactic measures with their non-state proxies, since a state that fails
to take measures to avoid violations of law by its proxies will have failed to
meet its due diligence obligations. Liability for the failure to uphold
Common Article 1 obligations may not be a moral equivalent to a finding of
state responsibility where a state has used proxies to evade international law
deliberately. However, it can go a significant way toward providing
accountability for states that fail to take reasonable measures to prevent IHL
violations and thus toward creating the proper incentives for states.
V. Recommendations to States in an Era of Uncertainty
The legal landscape we have outlined in this Article is one in which the
law of state responsibility remains in flux. There is limited case law on the
doctrine of state responsibility, and there is even less on the legal obligations
that attend to states under Common Article 1. Nonetheless, the danger for
states is a real one: States working with non-state actors must be concerned
about legal liability for those non-state actors' behavior.
Here we propose concrete, IHL-protective measures that states can take
to alleviate this danger. These measures would fulfill states' Common
Article 1 duty to ensure respect. Moreover, even absent an affirmative
defense for purposes of a finding of attribution, as we recommend in Part IV,
the attribution bar is high enough that these measures, taken alone, are
unlikely to trigger attribution. These measures also have the important
feature of decreasing the likelihood of significant IHL violations. That
should be reason enough for states to take the steps recommended here.
The literature on Common Article 1 does not provide a clear list of what
measures a state can take with regard to non-state actors to discharge its
Common Article 1 obligations.17 2 However, a number of international NGOs
that engage with non-state actors, such as the ICRC and the humanitarian
organization Geneva Call, have recorded best practices for encouraging these
172. Writings by ICRC legal staff have suggested, however, that under Common Article 1,
third-state obligations are not obligations "of result." Accordingly, the ICRC argues that due
diligence imposes obligations on the conduct of states, but does not require them to attain specific
outcomes. States will not be held responsible for failures to prevent other states from violating the
Conventions as long as they can show that they "ma[d]e every effort" to prevent the violation.
Ddrmann & Serralvo, supra note 1022, at 724 ("[T]he obligation of result is an obligation to
'succeed', while the obligation of diligent conduct is an obligation to 'make every effort' .....
[T]hird States can only be under an obligation to exercise due diligence in choosing appropriate
measures to induce belligerents to comply with the law. This does not turn the duty to ensure respect
into a vacuous norm, since States are under the obligation, depending on the influence they may
exert, to take all possible steps, as well as any lawful means at their disposal, to safeguard respect
for IHL rules by all other States. If they fail to do so, they might incur international responsibility.")
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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actors to respect international humanitarian law. 17 3 Drawing on their work,
as well as recent regulatory and policy developments in the parallel area of
promoting international humanitarian law among private military security
contractors (PMSCs), 17 4 this Article sets forth some actions that a state should
(and perhaps must) take with respect to a non-state actor in order to discharge
its duties to "ensure respect." These steps are divided into those taken ex
ante and ex post. This is not meant as an exhaustive list of steps states may
take to meet their obligations under Common Article 1 when working with
non-state actors, but it is meant to be instructive.
Some scholars have argued that the knowledge factor for assessing due
diligence requirements under Common Article 1 is more exacting than that
under the Draft Articles.7 ' In exercising due diligence, states may be held
responsible not only if they were "aware" of the risk of a non-state actor's
violation of international humanitarian law, but also if they "ought to have
been aware" of the likelihood of such violations.176  In light of this
173. See infra notes 179, 186 and accompanying text.
174. Many commentators have elaborated on the positive obligations states have under
international law with respect to PMSCs. See, e.g., LINDSEY CAMERON & VINCENT CHETAIL,
PRIVATIZING WAR: PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIES UNDER PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 579 (2013); MOYAKINE, supra note 80, at 303-05; Laura A. Dickinson,
Contract as a Tool for Regulating Private Military Companies, in FROM MERCENARIES TO
MARKET: THE RISE AND REGULATION OF PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES 217, 223-25 (Simon
Chesterman & Chia Lehnardt eds., 2007); Expert Meeting on Private Military Security Contractors:
Status and State Responsibility for Their Actions, U. CTR. FOR INT'L HUMANITARIAN L. 34-35
(2005), http://www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/expert-meetings/2005/2rapport-compagniesjrivees
.pdf [https://perma.cc/6679-QT7Z]. One strand of international negotiations culminated in the
Montreux Document of 2008, which the United States and fifty-two other states supported. See
Montreux Document on Pertinent International Legal Obligations and Good Practices for States
Relating to Private Military and Security Companies Operating in Armed Conflict, Annex to the
Letter dated October 2, 2008 from the Permanent Rep. of Switzerland addressed to the Secretary-
General, U.N. Doc A/63/467-S/2008/636 (Oct. 6, 2008) [hereinafter Montreux Document]; see also
Participating States of the Montreux Document, SWISS FED. DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFF. (July 21,
2016), https://www.eda.admin.ch/edalen/fdfa/foreign-policy/international-law/international-
humanitarian-law/private-military-security-companies/participating-states.html
[https://perma.cc/RM79-PCRP]. The most relevant part of the Montreux Document provides that
Contracting States have an obligation, within their power, to ensure respect for international
humanitarian law by PMSCs they contract, in particular to educate and train PMSCs and their
personnel in international humanitarian law; to take measures to prevent PMSCs from violating
international humanitarian law; and to take measures to correct violations of international
humanitarian law by PMSCs' personnel through appropriate regulatory measures and sanctions.
See Montreux Document, supra, ¶ 3.
175. See Dormann & Serralvo, supra note 102, at 734 (noting that under Articles 6 and 7,
respectively, of the 2013 U.N. Arms Trade Treaty, a state may not transfer arms to non-state actors
if it has knowledge that the recipients will use the weapons to violate the Geneva Conventions or if
there is an "overriding risk" of a violation); Tonkin, supra note 144, at 794-95 (suggesting that a
hiring state could be liable for an IHL violation if, in hiring a PMSC, it knows or should know of
an increased risk that the PMSC will violate international humanitarian law).
176. Tonkin, supra note 146, at 795 ("The third key consideration is whether the hiring state
was aware, or ought to have been aware, of the enhanced risk of violation by the PMSC. Although
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consideration, policies adopted by states to ensure IHL compliance should be
established and made clear to all actors in advance, and a non-state actor's
acceptance and understanding of a state's IHL policies should be a condition
precedent o engagement. 177
A. Ex Ante Recommendations
1. Vetting.-The state should vet any non-state actor with which it plans
to work, along with its members. Depending on the context, this process may
require national or international records from the host state, possibly
including criminal records and civil complaints alleging human rights
violations;178 psychological testing;'79  mental health checks;180  and
information collection on the ground, from social media, and from other
public sources to the greatest extent practicable. If the non-state actor-or
its members-has a history of violating international law, such that a
the law of state responsibility contains no general requirement of fault, obligations of prevention
frequently require some degree of knowledge or constructive knowledge on the part of the state in
order to establish breach. For example, in assessing responsibility for a failure to protect life, the
European Court of Human Rights employs a test of 'foreseeability of the event': the state is
responsible if the authorities knew or ought to have known of the risk to life and failed to take
measures which, judged reasonably, might have prevented the occurrence of the fatal event. In [a]
similar vein, in the Genocide case the ICJ held that the obligation to prevent and punish genocide
applies wherever a state is aware, or should normally be aware, of a serious risk that genocide will
occur." (citations omitted)).
177. See Olivier Bangerter, The ICRC and Non-State Armed Groups, in GENEVA CALL:
EXPLORING CRITERIA & CONDITIONS FOR ENGAGING ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS TO RESPECT
HUMANITARIAN LAW & HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 74, 81 (2007) (arguing top-level commanders must
insist that international humanitarian law be incorporated in all planning, organization, and
execution of operations).
178. Cf ANNE-MARIE BUZATU, GENEVA CTR. FOR THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF ARMED
FORCES, EUROPEAN PRACTICES OF REGULATION OF PMSCS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
REGULATION OF PMSCs THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LEGAL INSTRUMENTS 42-43 (2008)
(suggesting such vetting for PMSCs).
179. DynCorp (a PMSC) and the French Foreign Legion engage in psychological testing as part
of their vetting processes. Id at 43.
180. Cf First Armed Guard ISO Vetting Scheduled for March, INTERMANAGER (Dec. 11,
2012), http://www.intermanager.org/2012/12/first-armed-guard-iso-vetting-scheduled-for-march/
[https://perma.cc/PY4R-R8ZN] (noting that mental health checks are part of vetting maritime
PMSCs).
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violation in the future is reasonably foreseeable,81 the state should refrain
from working with it.
2. Training.-Given that non-state actors often commit international
law violations in part because they are unaware of them,1 82 a state should
ensure that a non-state actor is aware of the applicable international
humanitarian law.1 83 In some cases, this will require that he state assist in
training the non-state actor. The Geneva Conventions require, moreover, that
states disseminate the texts of the Conventions to relevant belligerents.184
In implementing training programs, NGOs have emphasized the
following best practices: (1) providing training that is not overly academic or
theoretical, but rather, relevant to the given context;85 (2) focusing on
particular norms rather than all norms generally (although there is
disagreement among NGOs on this issue);18 6 (3) conducting training at the
highest levels of command;18' (4) engaging former members of the non-state
actor in developing the training;'8 8 (5) engaging local populations in
181. For evidence of the "foreseeability of the event" standard used to determine state
responsibility for failure to fulfill "to ensure respect" duties under the European Convention on
Human Rights, see Keenan v. United Kingdom, 2001-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 93, 128, T 89; Kilip v.
Turkey, 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R. 75, 96-98, TT 65-68.
182. ANNYSSA BELLAL & STUART CASEY-MASLEN, GENEVA ACAD. INT'L HUMANITARIAN
LAW & HUMAN RIGHTS, RULES OF ENGAGEMENT: PROTECTING CIVILIANS THROUGH DIALOGUE
WITH ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS 6 (2011), http://www.geneva-academy.ch/docs/publications/
Policy%20studies/Rules%20of/o20Engagement.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5P4-3ELH] [hereinafter
ADH Report]; INT'L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INCREASING RESPECT FOR INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS 12 (2008),
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/icrc_002_0923.pdf [https://perma.cc/62CF-GHDW]
[hereinafter ICRC REPORT].
183. See Tonkin, supra note 146, at 796 ("The hiring state should also take steps to ensure that
PMSC personnel are adequately trained and instructed in IHL. The obligation to ensure respect for
IHL is commonly taken to include an obligation to ensure that national troops are trained and
instructed in accordance with IHL standards. This would also require that a state ensure the training
and instruction of any PMSCs it hires to perform military and security activities in armed conflict
or occupation.").
184. Geneva Convention I, supra note 9, at art. 47; Geneva Convention II, supra note 9, at
art. 48; Geneva Convention III, supra note 9, at art. 127; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 9, at
art. 144; see also First Additional Protocol, supra note 9, at art. 83 (affirming these provisions and
obligations). These provisions should be interpreted to impose the requirement for states to
disseminate the texts of the Geneva Conventions to non-state actors they are supporting. See
MOYAKINE, supra note 80, at 314 (identifying and explaining the dissemination provisions cited
above); TONKIN, supra note 151, at 197-98 (noting the application of the dissemination provisions
to PMSCs).
185. ICRC REPORT, supra note 182, at 13.
186. ADHReport, supra note 182, at 26.
187. Id. at 19; Bangerter, supra note 177, at 82.
188. ADHReport, supra note 182, at 35.
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developing the training;'89 and (6) emphasizing the legitimacy benefits of
abiding by international humanitarian law.' 90
3. Written Agreements.-The state should have the non-state actor sign
written agreements that the non-state actor will respect its international legal
obligations. This recommendation addresses the fact that non-state actors
often assert that they are not bound by international humanitarian law
because they are not (and in most cases cannot be) parties to the relevant
treaties.191 Having non-state actors sign written agreements provides another
means to hold them accountable. It puts them on notice, moreover, that any
support that is provided is contingent on continued compliance with IHL
obligations.
NGOs have noted that these agreements can take different forms:
(1) special agreements between parties to a conflict,19 2 (2) unilateral
declarations that are made generally or to an NGO,1 9 3 and (3) codes of non-
state actor conduct hat incorporate international humanitarian law.194 These
agreements may also be analogized to contracts undertaken between states
and PMSCs. When hiring PMSCs, scholars have suggested that exercising
due diligence requires including contract provisions that stipulate PMSC
personnel will follow international humanitarian law. 195
189. GENEVA CALL, ENGAGING WITH ARMED NON-STATE ACTORS IN THE BROADER MIDDLE
EAST ON THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS 13 (2012), http://www.genevacall.org/wp-
content/uploads/dlmuploads/2013/11/20120331_engaging with armednon-stateactors.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9253-QFFW] [hereinafter GENEVA CALL REPORT].
190. ADH Report, supra note 182, at 23 (noting that most non-state actors desire to be
recognized as legitimate, including among local populations); Olivier Bangerter, Reasons Why
Armed Groups Choose to Respect International Humanitarian Law or Not, 93 INT'L REV. RED
CROSS 353, 358 (2011), https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/review/2011/irrc-882-bangerter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SX2D-HH4A] ("Self-image is one of the most powerful generators of respect for
IHL.").
191. ADH Report, supra note 182, at 6-7, 7 n.13; ICRC REPORT, supra note 182, at 11.
192. ADHReport, supra note 182, at 34; ICRC REPORT, supra note 182, at 16-18; Bangerter,
supra note 177, at 82.
193. Bangerter, supra note 177, at 82-83; ICRC REPORT, supra note 182, at 19-21; ADH
Report, supra note 182, at 34. As an example, Geneva Call has used this strategy, encouraging non-
state actors to sign Deeds of Commitment renouncing the use of land mines and other tactics that
violate international humanitarian law. GENEVA CALL REPORT, supra note 189, at 10.
194. ICRC REPORT, supra note 182, at 22-23.
195. See Tonkin, supra note 146, at 797 ("Another requirement of Common Article 1 is the
inclusion of clear and appropriate rules of IHL in the contract of employment. Indeed, this
represents the most direct way of imposing conditions on PMSC employees. Such contractual
clauses should be accompanied by adequate procedures for supervising contractors in the field.").
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B. Ex Post Recommendations
1. Punishment Framework.-The state should ensure that the non-state
actor has an adequate punishment framework in place to deal with individuals
who violate international humanitarian law. 196 A similar concept is found in
diplomatic protection law: The ILC has noted that in that context the due
diligence obligation does not require successfully preventing a private actor
from taking an action, but it does require taking "adequate protective
measures" to prevent the action, and punishing the private actor if the action
is taken.197
Many questions arise regarding what would constitute an "adequate"
punishment framework. Although answering such questions in detail goes
beyond the scope of this Article, the punishment framework should, at a
minimum, include: (1) oversight and monitoring; 8 (2) investigation of
alleged violations;1 99 (3) prosecution of alleged violators;200 and
(4) punishment of convicted violators. This recommendation is a response
to the concern that non-state actors often feel unconstrained by the law since
they are already acting unlawfully by taking up arms against a state.
Implementing punitive frameworks with regard to non-state actors does,
however, pose a number of challenges largely unaddressed in the literature.
Presumably, punishment mechanisms must be compliant with international
humanitarian law. There is little guidance or clarity to help determine
whether non-Western forms of adjudication would be sufficient to meet the
due process requirements under Common Article 3. Nevertheless, providing
for some mechanism of accountability for non-state-actor conduct may be
essential for a state to exercise due diligence under Common Article 1.201
196. See, e.g., MOYAKINE, supra note 80, at 360 (suggesting that countries employing PMSCs
have a duty to create frameworks to address human rights violations arising out of their operations).
197. See Int'l Law Comm'n, Rep. on the Work of Its Twenty-Seventh Session, U.N. Doc.
A/10010/Rev.1, at 71 (1975) (noting that, although the acts of private actors are not directly
attributable to the state, the state has a duty to reasonably protect against and deal with harm caused
by its contractors); see also MOYAKINE, supra note 80, at 324 ("That the duty to punish might be
understood as a broad international obligation to legislate, investigate, prosecute, punish, and
provide redress appears to be quite clear.").
198. See MOYAKINE, supra note 80, at 324 (stating that the duty imposed upon states to take
measures to prevent abuses by non-state actors applies to PMSCs).
199. See id. (stating that the duty imposed upon states to investigate abuses by non-state actors
applies to PMSCs).
200. In the context of Common Article 1 obligations for PMSCs, Tonkin suggests that this may
also entail extradition. See Tonkin, supra note 146, at 798 ("[I]f the violation constitutes a criminal
offence over which the hiring state has jurisdiction, the state should take steps to arrest and prosecute
or extradite the perpetrator.").
201. The ICJ considered punishment a requirement of international obligations in Bosnian
Genocide. Bosnian Genocide, Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. 43, ¶ 439 (Feb. 26).
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2. Cessation of Support.-The state should withdraw some or all of its
support to the non-state actor if it is found to have breached a certain
threshold of international law violations. A state is more likely to incur
responsibility for breach of its Common Article 1 obligations for supporting
a non-state actor that it knows is violating international humanitarian law.
A single violation would not necessarily require a cessation of support.
If the primary obligations owed by the state are due diligence obligations,
Article 14(3) of the Draft Articles arguably comes into play. Article 14(3)
provides: "The breach of an international obligation requiring a State to
prevent a given event occurs when the event occurs and extends over the
entire period during which the event continues and remains not in conformity
with that obligation."2 0 2 The state might decide that it is appropriate to give
the non-state actor an opportunity to respond to the violation to prevent it
from recurring.
Conclusion
Today, states are increasingly working with and through non-state actors
in a range of contexts. As a result, there is a real and growing danger that
states will use non-state actors to avoid their international legal obligations.
The leading legal framework for addressing this danger-modern attribution
doctrine-adopts a bright-line rule: A state is responsible, or it is not. This,
in turn, has generated a set of perverse incentives for states that collaborate
with non-state actors in armed conflict situations, granting them virtually free
reign below the attribution threshold while discouraging them from
exercising responsible control that might push them over the threshold. If
the purpose of state-responsibility doctrine is to encourage states to engage
responsibly with non-state partners and hold states accountable by punishing
bad actors, the existing framework falls dangerously short.
The more robust interpretation of Common Article 1 of the Geneva
Conventions recently endorsed by the ICRC in its landmark new
commentaries could help address this shortcoming, closing much of the
accountability gap left by modern attribution doctrine in armed conflict
situations. Rightly understood, Common Article I's "to ensure respect"
provision requires states to take steps to prevent non-state actors from
violating international humanitarian law, even when they do not exercise
effective or overall control over them. Failure to exercise due diligence to
prevent non-state partners' IHL violations constitutes an independent source
of state responsibility.
202. Draft Articles, supra note 12, at art. 14, ¶ 3; see MOYAKINE, supra note 80, 325-26 ("The
positive measures to be taken by States may include the duty to intervene when a violation of
international law is likely to occur and to regulate the activities of private actors in order to prevent
breaches of international humanitarian and human rights law.").
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Although Common Article 1 goes a long way toward closing the
accountability gap, it does not fully resolve the incentives problem. States
that instruct, train, and equip their non-state partners in an effort to fulfill
their Common Article 1 duties are more likely to cross the threshold for
attribution liability than states that eschew such prophylactic measures.203 In
part as a result, states have already expressed reluctance to accept the positive
obligations entailed in the new commentaries.204 To address this concern,
states that take actions to meet their due diligence obligations under Common
Article 1 should be permitted to plead an affirmative defense: If a state has
exercised due diligence to ensure non-state actors abide by the Geneva
Conventions, and those actors nevertheless do commit ultra vires violations,
the state should not be held responsible. This innovation would not only
comport with common sense, but would also encourage states to embrace the
ICRC's more robust reading of Common Article 1 and take reasonable
measures to ensure that their partner non-state actors comply with
international law.
203. See supra Part IV.
204. For a discussion of U.S. State Department Legal Advisor Brian Egan's early reaction to
the publication of the new commentaries, see Oona Hathaway & Zachary Manfredi, The State
Department Adviser Signals a Middle Road on Common Article 1, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 12, 2016,
10:42 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/30560/state-department-adviser-signals-middle-road-
common-article-l/ [https://perma.cc/RVT5-LLXC].
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